Strategic Compromise in Islam1

The American invasion and occupation of Iraq posed a question of vital importance to Iraqi Shi‘ites: to fight or not to fight? While Baathist loyalists, Wahhabi extremists, and some Shi‘ite fringe groups have resorted to violence and terrorism, the Shi‘ite community deferred the decision to its religious leaders, led by Grand Ayatullah Sayyid ‘Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani, and the response was a resounding “no.” While this passive, quietist, approach may displease the likes of firebrand clerics like Muqtada Sadr and his followers, it is a mature, responsible approach, deeply-rooted in faith and a profound understanding of strategic compromise in Islam.

When the early Muslims were in a position of weakness, the Prophet Muhammad saw himself obliged to sign the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, to the objection of companions like ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab who found the terms humiliating. The Prophet, however, understood that the Muslims were few and feeble and that they needed time to regroup, rebuild and grow stronger. He knew that he was not in a position of strength, did not have the upper hand, and needed to compromise. Muslims have much to learn from the Prophet’s diplomacy.

When Imam ‘Ali’s Caliphate was usurped on three occasions, he did not respond with the sword, but with silence and patience. The Imam understood that a civil war in the early days of the Islamic movement, when Muslims were surrounded by hostile enemies on all fronts, could very well lead to the annihilation of Islam. His weapons were taqiyyah [pious dissimulation] and withdrawal from public affairs. As a result of these actions, many Muslims became keenly aware that there was something seriously wrong with the system. The Imam’s apparent inaction was in fact the wisest and most effective of action through which he called into question the legitimacy and undermined the authority of the opportunistic rulers. Even after obtaining power, he was always reluctant to wage war against misguided Muslims and only resorted to violence when it was the last resort. And, even then, he preferred exhortation, negotiation and treaties to war and bloodshed.

Imam al-Hasan al-Mujtabah, the second Imam, was in a position of weakness, could not count on his army, and opted for strategic compromise. He made a peace treaty with Mu‘awiyyah which was supposed to safeguard the Sunnah of the Prophet, halt the imprecations against ‘Ali, divest Mu‘awiyyah from the title of Amir al-Mu’minin (Leader of the Believers), protect the rights and privileges of the Shi‘ites and the honor of their women and halt Mu‘awiyyah from appointing anybody as his successor, thus opening the door for an eventual transition of the Islamic government to its rightful heir, Imam al-Husayn, the third Imam. By the time of Imam al-Husayn, Yazid had succeeded his father Mu‘awiyyah as Caliph, innovation and corruption had reached epic proportions and the very survival of Islam was in jeopardy. Although he knew he would not succeed in obtaining temporal power, nor even survive the epic ordeal of Karbala, the Imam had no choice but to take a stand for original Islam and die defending it. Shockwaves were sent throughout the Muslim world as a result of the senseless slaughter of Imam al-Husayn and his Household. Truth vanquished falsehood and the final nail was placed in the coffin of the Umayyad Empire.

The Imams who succeeded Imam al-Husayn were all obliged by socio-political circumstances to adopt policies of strategic compromise. Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq, for example, did not endorse Zayd’s rebellion. He knew that any uprising against the imperial forces would be of no avail. Although he was offered the Caliphate by Ma‘mun, Imam ‘Ali al-Rida he refused to succumb to his ruse, and declined the offer. When his hand was forced, he finally agreed to accept the succession - knowing that it would never come to pass - on condition that he did not command, nor order, nor give legal decisions, nor judge, nor appoint, nor dismiss, nor change anything.

The Caliphate had become so inherently corrupt that the Imams did not want any part of it. They devoted themselves to the intellectual sphere of struggle, preserving and spreading the authentic teachings of Islam as had been preserved by their Family. It must not be forgotten that most of the Imams passed their entire lives, until they were martyred, without appearing or speaking in public. The occultation of Imam al-Mahdi is meant not only as a period of preparation for an appointed time, but as a lesson in “anonymity” for the followers of Ahl al-Bayt, not to confront the enemy directly. Shi‘ite Islam teaches to put one’s faith in God and to wait for the right time, the right moment. In the meanwhile, one must prepare oneself with knowledge and arguments to be able to discuss a series of topics when the time comes and not before. The quietist strategy is not a detachment from politics but a form of passive resistance.

The reactionaries who hold that there is no compromise in Islam have a superficial understanding of the political strategies of the Prophet Muhammad and the Twelve Imams. True revolutionaries require patience and comprehend the importance of timing. The Baathist regime was doomed to destruction and had no hope of surviving any full-scale armed conflict against the most powerful nation in the world, the United States. Shi‘ite scholars saw no point in sacrificing the lives of Iraqis defending a repressive, genocidalist regime, which had slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Iranian and Iraqi Shi‘ites, Kurds, and Islamic students and scholars. The Qur’an is clear on the point:

“Did not God check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of God is commemorated in abundant measure” (22:40).

Lead by the wisdom and political maturity of Sayyid al-Sistani, the Shi‘ite Muslims decided to make a strategic compromise not to fight the coalition forces but rather to cooperate with them - within reasonable limits and without recognizing their right to occupy Iraq - to ensure a prompt transfer of power to the Iraqi people and the establishment of an Islamic democracy. The real revolutionaries in Iraq are not the Baathist loyalists, the Wahhabi terrorists or the Shi‘ite reactionaries who seek to foment sectarian strife, destabilize Iraq and draw the country into a bloody civil war. The real revolutionaries are those who have been deep in taqiyyah [pious dissimulation] for decades and who have made a strategic compromise to cooperate with the coalition for the sake of the greater good.

• 1. This article was originally published in Al-Bawaba: The Middle East Gateway on August 4th, 2004. It was subsequently picked up by the wire, and reproduced world-wide in numerous media sources. As Al-Bawaba does not archive its articles, “Strategic Compromise” is no longer available on its website. Hence, we are pleased to reproduce it in this more permanent medium for the sake of posterity.