Economic Doctrine And Islam

Before we set out to study a particular economic doctrine, it is best to agree at the very beginning as to what we mean by the term ‘doctrine’. This will help to illuminate, at the outset of our efforts, the guideposts to the goal and the nature of the contents, which any discussion of the economic doctrine should make explicit and clear.

What does the term ‘doctrine’ mean? What is the difference between economic doctrine and science of economics? Which are the fields (in economics) that are treated ‘doctrinally’?

Based on the answers to these questions, we shall determine the guideposts to the economic doctrine in a broad way, by which we will set the nature of the inquiry in respect of the Islamic economic doctrine. In this connection, we may recall what we said about the meaning of the terms ‘doctrine’ and ‘science’ in a previous discussion.1 We stated that “economic doctrine is the way that the society prefers to follow in its economic life and in solving of its practical issues” while “science of economics is the science which describes the economic life, economic events and economic phenomena, the relationships among those events and phenomena, and the general factors and rules determining them”.

These definitions indicate an essential difference between the two. But this step is inadequate when we attempt to discover a particular doctrine or to form a conclusive idea about it. However we have made use of this basic distinction to make it easy for the reader to become acquainted with the nature of Islamic economics, which we are now studying. It will also enable him to perceive in light of this distinction that Islamic economics is a doctrine and not a science. It is the way that Islam prefers to its adherents to follow in their economic life. Islamic economics is not an exercise whereby Islam expounds and interprets the events in economic life and describes laws that govern them.

To realize this goal and to emphasize the doctrinal nature of the Islamic economics, it is sufficient for us to say respect of doctrine that it is a system, and that in respect of science that it is an interpretation. From this t we know clearly that Islamic economics is an economic doctrine and not a science of economics. But now it is necessary for us to know that the economic doctrine is much more than this so that we mark out - in light of our understanding of the term - the spheres in which it functions, and then to search for the ways Islam is connected with each.

In which fields does the economic doctrine operate? How far does its range extend to? What is the overriding characteristic that we find in each doctrinal economic idea - that makes the characteristic a hallmark of those doctrinal thoughts in Islam - which we may try to combine and draw up in one single bunch? All these questions demand that we give a definite meaning to the doctrine, as distinct from science, which is capable of providing the answers to all these questions. And in this connection, it will not be sufficient to say that the doctrine is simply a “way”.

There are those who consider the scope of doctrine as being restricted only to wealth distribution, and that it has nothing to do with production since the processes of production are ruled by the laws under the science of economics. Consider the production of wheat or textile – the production processes and the level of human acquaintance with the forces of production and their characteristics. The process of the production and all the related factors do not become any different with the difference in the nature of the economic doctrines.

Hence economic science is the science of the laws of production, and economic doctrine is the art of the distribution of wealth. As such any research work related to production and its improvement – or innovations with respect to the factors of production - is a subject matter of the science of economics. It is of universal nature, in which nations do not differ just because of differences in social principles and concepts or because a nation embraces one particular principle instead of another.

Any research that describes wealth, its ownership or its disposal, is on the subject matter of doctrinal research, as these constitute part of the economic system. These are unrelated to the science of economics. They are connected to the worldviews that the respective doctrines adopted such as capitalism, communism or Islamic.

However, a big mistake is usually involved in making this distinction between the science and the doctrine. It is based on the premise that the sphere, which each of them deals with, is different from that of the other. This leads to the thinking that the doctrinal characteristic and scientific characteristic are two outcomes from studying two different spheres, such that if the research is on production then it is a scientific research and if it is about distribution then it is a doctrinal research.

The fact is that the science and the doctrine differ from each other as to the method and the goal of the research, not as to their subject matter and the sphere of concern. The doctrinal research remains doctrinal and preserves its doctrinal stamp as long as it keeps to its particular method and goals, even when it deals with the subject of production itself. Likewise the scientific research does not lose its scientific nature, even if it deliberates on distribution and examines it with the method and the goals appropriate to the science of economics.

It is on account of this that we find that the idea of centralized planning for production - whereby the state exercises the authority of administering and supervising production - is one of the most important doctrinal theories. It is regarded as an essential element in the socialist doctrine or system, or other doctrines and systems that lean toward socialism. This is so despite the fact that we know that planning of production and its control by a higher body like the state does not mean that body owns the forces of production. Nor is it connected with the issue of distribution of the factors of production among individuals.

The idea of centralization of production is therefore a doctrinal thought, connected with the economic doctrine. It is not a subject matter under the science of economics, although it deals with production, not distribution. On the contrary, we may find many thoughts that deal with (wealth) distribution aspects being included in under the science of economics, even though they are connected with distribution, not production. For instance, Ricardo declared that the share of the labourer from the wealth produced - which is represented in wages - does not increase in amount under any circumstance from what is merely sufficient for the sustenance of living.

When he said that, he did not mean to affirm anything doctrinal. Nor was he laying down a rule for the state to prescribe a system for the payment of wages, like the system of private ownership and economic freedom. He was only trying to explain the reality in which the labourers live and the inevitable result of this reality, given the state’s rejection of policy on wage limits in adherence of its belief in the economic freedom in its capacity as a capitalist state.

The doctrinal aspects of economics and those of its science both encroach into each other’s sphere and examine the issues of production and distribution together. However, this should not lead us to avoid differentiating the two in economic research. Such approach is favoured by those who were convinced that there is no economic system in Islam, when it was not possible for them to differentiate positively between the science and doctrine parts of economics.

They thought that a statement about the existence of the economic system in Islam would be tantamount to claiming that Islam was ahead of western thinkers in the scientific creation of the political economy. They also thought that a statement as to the existence of the Islamic economics would mean that we shall find within Islam an economic thought and scientific discussion in respect of the laws of economic life such as production and distribution, like those we find in the discussions by Adam Smith, Ricardo and many such leading political economists. Since we do not find in Islam such discussions, then according to them, the so-called Islamic economics is nothing but a myth and merely a figment of imagination.

However these people would give up their conviction as to the non-existence of the Islamic economics, if they would clearly grasp the difference between economic doctrine and economic science - or political economy, as it is named - and would know that Islamic economics is a doctrine and not a science.

An economic doctrine consists of all fundamental rules of economic life connected with the relevant ideology of social justice. The science of economics, in turn, comprises all theories, which describes the reality of economic life apart from a preconceived ideology or an ideal on justice. Thus, it is the ideology of justice, which is the dividing line between ideology and science, and the hallmark demarcation by which doctrinal ideas are distinguished from scientific theories. It is such because the ideology of justice itself is not a scientific or tangible entity that is capable of being measured and observed, or subjected to scientific experiments.

Justice is only a moral judgment and appraisal. So when you want to know the scope of justice in respect of the system of private ownership or to pass judgment with respect to the institution of interest-based banking, as to whether it is just or otherwise, you do not have recourse to those scientific methods and measurements which you would employ in the measurement of atmospheric heat or the boiling temperature of a certain liquid. Heat and evaporation are physical phenomena capable of being subjected to scientific assessment. But in appraising justice you need to resort to ethical values and higher ideals, which are beyond the boundaries of physical measurement.

Justice itself is not a scientific idea. Therefore, when it combines with a thought, it imprints it with a doctrinal stamp and makes it distinct from scientific thinking. Hence those principles related to private ownership, economic freedom, prohibition of interest or nationalisation of the forces of production, all these are included in the doctrine because they are connected with the idea of justice.

As for the law of the diminishing marginal returns, the law of demand and supply, or the iron law of wages, all these are the laws of economic science. They have nothing to do with the appraisal of those economic practices. The law of the diminishing returns cannot judge whether the diminishing return is fair or oppressive. It only reveals it as permanent objective reality. Likewise, the law of supply and demand cannot justify the rise in price - due to a shortage of supply or an increase of demand - according to any particular idea of justice.

It only shows the objective reciprocal relationship between the price (of goods) and the quantities of supply and demand, in the sense of these being a certain inevitable manifestation of capitalist market. It is similar in respect of the iron law of wages. It explains, in the context of objective reality – as to what make workers end up always receiving wages barely adequate for their basic sustenance - irrespective of whether their miserable share in the distribution is fair or otherwise.

The fact is that none of the scientific laws rests on the ideology of justice. They only rely on deductions from the reality and observation of its numerous manifestations in various forms. In contrast, doctrinal laws are always embodied in a particular idea of justice.

Yet this clear-cut division between a doctrinal inquiry and a scientific inquiry does not prevent or preclude a doctrine from occasionally assuming a scientific frame of inquiry. Just as in the case of the laws of demand and supply or the iron law of wages, these laws are applicable to the reality that they describe in a capitalist society and do scientifically conform to doctrinal capitalism. These are scientific laws within a particular doctrinal framework. They are not universal scientific laws and are not valid in other frameworks, as we have elaborately explained in earlier part of this book.2

By merely drawing this clear line of demarcation between economic doctrine and science of economics, we come to know that by saying that economic doctrine exists in Islam does not mean that Islam investigates the law of supply and demand, or measures the effects of the increase or decrease in supplies or demands in the free market. Instead, Islam inquiries about the granting of freedom to the market and calls for its protection and preservation, or that Islam calls for supervision of the market and restrictions on its freedom in conformity with the concept of justice it adopts.

Similarly Islam does not investigate (the question of) the relationship between variation in (commercial) profits and interest, or the relationship between the flow of interest-based lending and commercial activities. Nor does Islam investigate the factors that lead to variation in profits. But it appraises profit and interest, and expresses judgment in respect of usurious or commercial investment as to whether they each conform to its idea of justice. Similarly, Islam does not investigate the phenomenon of diminishing returns in production or their causes, but it inquires whether it is legitimate and fair to place production under the supervision of a higher central body.

From the above, we learn that it is the role of economic doctrine to solve the problems of economic life, according to its idea of justice. In Islam, the two expressions halal (permitted) and haram (prohibited) are embodied in the values and the ideals that Islam believes in. When we put these together, then it is only natural that it may lead us to the conviction that Islamic economic doctrine does exist.

The consideration of halal and haram in Islam extends to all human activities and the scope covers all behaviours - the conduct of the rulers and their subjects, of buyers and sellers, employers and employees, the workers and the jobless. Every bit of these behaviours is either halal or haram and consequently, either just or unjust. When Islam prohibits explicitly a specific action then that act is haram. Otherwise it is halal.

Now if each activity in the economic life is subject to the consideration of halal or haram - interpreted in term of the values and ideals - the correct method of inquiry in the quest for the Islamic economic doctrine, is to be guided by values, ideals and conceptions reflected in the rules determining halal and haram matters.

The Relationship Between Economic Doctrine And The Civil Law

Just as we have learned that economic doctrine is different from economic science, we should also know the difference between economic doctrine and civil law. Economic doctrine is a collection of the fundamental theories that deals with the problems of economic life, and civil law is the legislative provisions that regulate in details the relationship among individuals and their personal rights including those related to pecuniary matters.

On this basis, the economic doctrine of a society cannot be the same thing as the civil law of the state as it is obvious that the capitalist economic doctrine of many countries in the world is not the civil laws in the respective states. For this reason, two states – for instance Germany and Italy - may differ from each other as to their respective civil laws, while both embrace the same economic doctrine. Those civil laws do not form a part of the capitalist system. The civil laws of the capitalist states that regulate trading, leasing or loan contracts, for instance, do not constitute part of capitalism in the sense of its being an economic doctrine (system).

These civil laws were applied because of the features of the capitalist economic doctrine that would result in conflicts between the basic principles of capitalism and the finer legal consequences in their application. The laws deal with practical difficulties arising from the fundamental principles of capitalism in respect of freedom of ownership, freedom of use as well as freedom of investment. These are the laws, which the capitalist system with its principles of freedom relies upon.

It would therefore be a mistake for the researcher on Islamic economics to offer a collection of Islamic rules and laws which are on the plane of the civil law according to the understanding of the time, and present them - in conformity with their legal texts - as the Islamic economic doctrine. Some Muslim writers do so when they attempt a study the economic doctrine (system) in Islam.

They speak of a collection of laws in Islam with regulations on property rights (huququl-maaliyyah) and business transactions (mu‘amalat) like the Islamic laws in respect of trading, leasing, partnership, product specifications, gambling, fraud and so on. It is indeed similar to someone who wants to study and determine the economic doctrine of the English nation, yet instead of identifying capitalism as its fundamental principles - in respect of property ownership, its use and investment and the concepts and values these fundamental principles represent – looks only at the country’s civil laws and regulations connected with private ownership.

But while we emphasize the need for the separation between the theoretical nature of the economic doctrine (system) and the civil law, we do not severe the relationship between the two. On the contrary we simultaneously emphasize the strong link that firmly binds the economic doctrine and the civil law of a society, in the sense of them being parts of an integrated structure.

As a matter of fact, the economic doctrine with its theories and fundamental principles form the foundation for the upper structure, which is the civil law. However, the economic doctrine being the theoretical foundation for the law does not disqualify it from being in the upper structure resting on another foundation, such that the entire theoretical edifice of the society is built on a common theoretical base. It draws together several principles with some of them resting on the other, that the preceding principle is considered the base and foundation on which the whole structure is built. The economic doctrine and the civil law are two such theoretical structures.

The civil law is the upper section of the two components, and takes shape in conformity with the economic doctrine and is determined in light of the theories and ideology, which that doctrine represents. To clarify this point further, let us take an example from the free enterprise doctrine in capitalism - and its connections with the civil laws in theory and practice – to demonstrate the link between them and the extent to which the law is affected by the doctrine.

It will be from the sphere of personal rights in civil law that we will be able to understand the influence of the economic doctrine on the civil law. We will learn that the theory of tort liability, which is the cornerstone of civil law, having received its theoretical input from the nature of the capitalist economy during the period capitalist ideas on economic freedom were raging and the principle of free enterprise held sway over the mainstream thinking.

The emergence of the will theory (in contract law) later, over the theory tort liability resulted from that. The theory of tort liability bears the doctrinal stamp of capitalism since it places emphasis - following capitalism’s belief in freedom and its individualist inclination - on the premise that it is the private will of the individual that is the sole source of all the personal obligations and rights. It does not accept the existence of the right of an individual over another, or the society’s right over an individual that is not backed by evidence demonstrating that such obligations and rights are established with his free and full willingness.

It is clear that the refusal to acknowledge the liability of a person towards another, which does not originate from the full and free will of the first person, only means a faithful translation of the ideals and essence of the capitalist doctrine (the economic freedom) from the economic doctrinal space to the legal arena. Because of this, we find that when the theory of tort liability is founded in another economic system, it differs from this. In such a case, the significance of will becomes far lesser.

Among the evidence that the capitalistic economic doctrine theories have been translated into elaborate legislative enactment on the legal plane, we can see how the civil law founded on the capitalist doctrine allows contracts for short-selling, futures trading, price differentials on credit sales and purchases, or employment of workers in oil extraction industry that enables the capitalist to own the oil produced. The law, in allowing all these, acquires legitimacy from the theories based on the capitalist economic doctrine. We find the same thing in the field of substantive law, including those in relation to property ownership. The law regulates the rights in accordance with the general standpoint, which the economic doctrine holds, in respect of the distribution of wealth.

Doctrinal capitalism, upholding freedom of ownership and viewing ownership as a sacred right, obliges the upper unit of its capitalist structure - the civil law - to permit individual ownership of property rights in mines in keeping with the principle of the freedom to own. It gives priority to the individual in benefitting from the property he owns over any other consideration and to grant him the freedom in using his property in a manner that he is pleased or fancies, irrespective of whatsoever, as long as the freedom emanates from his natural rights as an individual, not a social function that an individual exercises within the society.

After the peak of the era of the economic freedom, perception of private ownership underwent a change. New civil laws emerged disallowing ownership of some types of assets and natural resources, and restricting an asset owner in the deployment and enjoyment of his assets. All these bring to light and illustrate the interdependence between civil law and the respective economic doctrine to such a degree that it is possible to know and understand the economic doctrine and its original features by looking at the civil law in practise.

So a person can have recourse to the civil law of a country, if it is not feasible for him to directly get acquainted with its economic doctrine, in the sense that it is part of main structure with the economic system as the base. The civil law – as the upper section - reflects the essence of the economic doctrine and its general characteristics. In that case it would be possible for him, by studying the civil law of that country, to easily know whether it is a capitalist or socialist country. He may even gauge the degree to which the country practises its capitalism or its socialism.

Summary

So far we have discussed the general difference between economic doctrine and science of economics, and the difference between economic doctrine and civil law. From this discussion we could derive that it is incorrect to talk about Islamic economic doctrine as a science of economics, or as a collection of rules under the civil law that regulate commercial and transactions in the economic life.

Besides, we have also learnt the nature of the relationship between the doctrine and the law. In the coming chapters we shall, God willing, see the significance of this relationship. We have now realized the existence of an economic doctrine in Islam - which is not a science of economics - and made distinction between doctrine and law by understanding the nature of the relationship between them.

We should therefore now discuss our future work on Islamic economics in this book and scrutinize its essentials and their main points. We should also describe our method based on our earlier study and understanding of economic doctrine, economic science and civil law, and the nature of the relationship that binds the civil law to the doctrine.

The Process Of Discovery Versus The Process Of Formulation And Development

The research work we will carry out in our study of the Islamic economic doctrine will differ from that carried out by the leading exponents of the other economic doctrines. The researcher on the Islamic economic doctrine feels that his standpoint is fundamentally different from that who researches other economic systems like capitalism and communism.

The Islamic economic researcher or thinker finds himself before a completely established economic system and he is called upon to perceive its tangible aspects, determine its general framework, disclose the basic rules of thought that govern it, overcome (as far as possible) the consequences of long historical intervals, present its original features and reject the understandably strong inclination to recognize the dishonest attempts (by the ruling elites) make their practices look as if they were in conformity with Islam. Further, the researcher has to liberate his self from the framework of non-Islamic cultures that prevail in understanding of matters in accordance with their nature and thinking patterns. To endeavour to get over all these difficulties and to overcome them and reach at an Islamic economic doctrine is the job of the researcher of Islamic economics.

On this basis, it can be said that the process that we will pursue is a process of discovery. This is in contrast to the case with the thinkers who advocate the economic doctrines of capitalism and communism, for they pursue the process of formulation and development. Each of them - the process of discovery, and the process of formulation and development - has its characteristics and distinctions which are reflected in the research efforts that researchers carry out on Islamic economics and those on the capitalist or the communist economics.

The most important of these characteristics and distinctions are the determination of the manner of the conducting the procedure and its generalization. The process involving the formulation of the economic doctrine is intended to construct the complete theoretical structure of society. The deliberation thus proceeds in a normal sequence. It progresses in a natural order and performs the work of directly formulating the general theories of the economic doctrine. Then it uses them as the premise for the secondary inquiries and for the formation of the grand structure of laws, which rests on the economic doctrine and is considered as its upper section. This is like the civil law, which as we learnt earlier, rests on the economic doctrine as its foundation.

However, in the other process of the discovering the economic doctrine, the sequence of the work is the reverse. In pursuing this goal, we do not have in our possession an explicit picture of the doctrine or any of its features. Nor do we have a particular sketch of the doctrine before its being formed. We do not know whether the doctrine embraces the principles of common ownership or private ownership, just as we have no idea as to what theoretical basis it adopts for ownership - whether it is need, or work, or freedom.

Under this situation, so long as we do not have in our possession a definite text sourced from the originator of the doctrine (system) - in order to discover it - we have to remove the obscurity that encompasses the doctrine. The only alternative is to search for another method or unveil some of its hidden and unseen parts.

We can propose this method in light of the interdependence between an economic doctrine and the civil law, a relationship that we have explained earlier. As long as the civil law constitutes the upper section of the structure - resting on economic system and is shaped by the economic doctrine - it is possible to discover the economic doctrine by way looking at the civil law. We already know that the civil law rests on that unknown - the economic doctrine we are searching for.

Hence it is necessary for the process of discovery to search for the scattered radiations of the economic doctrine in the outer sphere - that is from the other parts in the main structure - and from its other signs, the traditions, that are reflected in other fields. We could arrive, by ascertaining these radiations and traces, at the stage whereby we could form a definite estimation of the type of thoughts and theories about the economic doctrine that lie hidden beneath the surface.

The process of discovery therefore needs to follow a path opposite to the course that the process of formulation and development follows. The process of discovery proceeds from the upper section of the structure towards its base. It sets about doing so by collecting all the traces and stringing them together and ascertaining the outline of the economic doctrine, instead of setting out from the doctrine formulation and progressing to the branches.

This will be our firm standpoint in respect of the process, which we will pursue for the discovery of the Islamic system of economy, or more correctly, much of it. While it is possible to present some aspects of the Islamic economics directly from the texts, there are some fundamental theories and ideas that are not easy to reach in the form of direct texts. Reaching them can be done only indirectly, that is by relying on the interdependence between the civil law in the general Islamic edifice. We will draw guidance from the laws by which Islam regulates the matters relating to contracts and rights.

So we proceed from the upper section and descend gradually to the base because we are carrying on the process of doctrine discovery. As for those who are carrying on the process of doctrine formulation and development, they ascend from the base to the upper story since in their situation the upper story comes only after the base.

In this way, our standpoint from the very beginning differs from that of the forerunners of the capitalist economic doctrine. Our standpoint also differs from that of those who are engaged in studies to discover and determine some economic doctrines whereby it is possible to reach their goals with a direct method. These economic doctrines are generally of the forms that conform with that heralded by the leading forerunners. For instance, our acquaintance with the economic doctrine of Adam Smith does not depend on our study of his thoughts in the sphere of civil law or the method it chooses to follow in regulating legal rights and obligations. Rather, we can combine its study with his doctrinal thought in the economic sphere.

The situation is the opposite when we seek to know the contents of the economic doctrine embraced by Islam. As long as we are not able to find their definite shapes in the Islamic sources (as we find it in the case of Adam Smith) we will be compelled to pursue its traces and to discover the economic doctrine in an indirect manner, as described earlier.

This makes the process of discovery that the Islamic researcher pursues to sometimes appear inconsistent. It appears that he makes no distinction between the economic doctrine and the civil law, when he tries to present the Islamic ordinances in the civil law and when he intends to study the economic doctrine in Islam. However he will indeed be right in doing so as long as he tries to present those laws as the upper section of the overall structure and capable of facilitating the discovery of the economic doctrine and not as the Islamic economic doctrine itself.

The Financial System As The Civil Law

In this connection it is necessary that we also link the financial system with the civil law as part of the grand structure of the economic doctrine, which reflects its features and takes shape according to its requirements. Just as it is possible for the process of discovery to benefit from the “radiations and traces” of the doctrine reflected in the civil law, it is likewise possible to benefit from similar doctrinal signs in respect of the financial system.

When we want to site an example of such influence of the economic doctrine on the financial system - being part of its grand structure - we can consider a relationship similar to that between the civil law and the economic system. One of the manifestations of the relationship between the capitalist system of economy and the general system of civil law is the effect of the thoughts on domains.

By “domains” we mean those assets, which are the properties of the state such as lands, forests, mines which the state owns and yield revenue for the government. The domain is considered in the financial system as one of the main source of revenue for the state. Under the influence of the principle of economic freedom, the concept of domains became less significant and the scope of the state-owned enterprises shrank and almost disappeared from the financial system of the state when the capitalist doctrine became dominant.

One of the requirements for the safeguarding the economic freedom was non-interference by the state in production activities. The only exception was those industries, in which individuals were incapable of operating, by virtue of their natural characteristics. For these, the capitalist state could rely on its general financial capacity using taxes and other sources of revenue.

Then, the domains regained prominence as an important source of state revenue and its scope expanded. This was particularly so after the emergence of the trends towards communism and the decline of the principle of economic freedom in the mainstream economic thinking. One of the evidence of the relationship between the economic doctrine and the general financial system is that the revenues of the state differ in their functions, in line with the respective economic doctrine.

During the period when the idea of the economic doctrine that upheld economic freedom was dominant, the main function of the revenue was to cover expenses of the state as an apparatus for the maintenance of security and the defence of the country. When the communist ideology began to prevail, the role of state revenue was broadened. It then included addressing the inequitable distribution of wealth, removal of disparity between social classes and the establishment of social justice.

The state was not content with the collection of revenue or taxes only to the extent it would cover its expenses as a machinery for the maintenance of security and the defence of the country. It broadened the scope further to include the new responsibilities it had prescribed for itself. These evidences prove that the revenue of the society is generally applied in line with the fundamental principle of the economic doctrine the society embraces, in the same way as the civil law is viewed as signposts in discovering the economic doctrine.

Summary And Deductions

On the basis of what has been discussed earlier, it becomes necessary that we include a number of Islamic rules and legal enactments, which may be construed as part of the grand structure constituting the economic system, within the orbit of the process of discovery of the economic doctrine, even if they are not wholly part of the doctrine itself.

For this reason, the discussion in this book will cover many of the ordinances in respect of mu‘amalat (pecuniary and personal relations) rights, which regulate the pecuniary relations between individuals. It will also cover some of the ordinances under the sacred law for the regulation of the financial relations between the state and the people, and the determination of the state’s sources of revenue and its policy in respect of the spending of these revenues.

As discussed earlier, this book does not intend only to present the Islamic economic doctrine. It also attempts to pursue the process of discovering the doctrine and to ascertain the modus operandi for this process, which is the course subject matter, and its results. For this purpose we shall select the relevant Islamic ordinances in respect of the mu‘amalat rights and (state) taxes and organize them accordingly. These rules may be considered as part of the grand structure of the system and they throw some light on the process of discovery. As for the ordinances that have no share in facilitating the discovery process, they will be excluded from the sphere of this inquiry.

We shall mention, as examples, the subjects of usury, fraud, kafarah (monetary penalty for expiation of certain offence) and the tax for religious war. Islam has prohibited interest in pecuniary transaction, just as it has prohibited frauds. The prohibition of interest and interest-based lending or borrowing has a role in the process of discovery, as it is a component of the grand structure of the theory of the wealth and income distribution, and as such reveals the fundamental rules for wealth distribution in Islam. This will be dealt with in our deliberation on wealth and income distribution, after the topic on production.

As for the prohibition of frauds, it is applicable not only to economic transactions in Islamic society. All societies, despite differences in their economic systems agree on this. It is similar in the case of kafarah and the tax for holy war (jihad). The redistributive tax, which Islam imposes for the maintenance of the social equilibrium like zakat, for example, has a part in the process of discovery. But it is not so in respect of the tax of holy war (jihad), which Islam enjoins for financing of the army of the mujahidin (the Islamic army) for it is a part of the mission of the Islamic state and not an element of the economic doctrine (system) of Islam.

The Synthesis Of The Laws (Ordinances)

When we consider the collection of the Islamic rules which regulate mu‘amalat and the rights and obligations (of the individual members of the community), let us shift our attention to what lies deep beneath these fundamental rules that give shape to the economic doctrine in Islam. In this connection, it is necessary that in presenting and examining the rules, we do not treat them as if each rule is independent or isolated from the others.

The method whereby each rule is isolated and treated independently is more appropriate for discussions of the rules in the legal sphere, since such discussions do not involve surveying and tracing the rules to the relevant doctrines. Such discussions only need to present the Islamic rules that regulates, for instance, the contracts relating to trading, leasing, loans or partnership. After that, there is no need for a synthesis between these rules that would lead to a general rule.

But since our study and presentation of these rules constitute part of the process of discovery, mere presentation of their details will be of no benefit to us even though many proponents of Islamic economic system are content to limit their research to this stage. We are of the view that there is no choice for us but to integrate these details. That means we should study each and every one of the rules as component parts of a single object and as a consolidated side of a main structure.

That will enable discovery of the general rule, which emanates from within a composite whole, with appropriate elucidation or rationalization. The discovery will not be possible by isolating the individual rules and treating each as independent of the others. The prohibition of interest in a loan contract, or the permissibility of an earning resulting from some factors of production under a leasing arrangement, or disallowing a lease holder from owning certain natural assets - lands, mines, etc. – that he has acquired by the lease contract; all these rules must be studied - after verifying their legal positions - and be synthesized together, to enable us to deduce the fundamental laws of Islam in respect of the distribution of income and wealth.

This would distinguish the Islamic standpoint in respect of the distribution of wealth generated by those economic activities from that under the communist doctrine, which establishes that distribution of wealth is only on the basis of work, or from that under the capitalist doctrine, which holds that distribution of wealth is on the basis of the various forces of production that jointly contribute in generating the wealth.

The Significance Of Key Conceptions In The Quest For The Islamic Economic Doctrine

We can place the conception that forms an important part of Islamic tradition in the same class with the prescripts of law, which contribute towards the discovery of the Islamic economic doctrine. By conception we mean every view or concept that explains a cosmic or social or legislative fact. The doctrinal belief of Islam about the relationship of the Universe with Allah, the Supreme and its connection with Him expresses a definite Islamic conception in respect of the universe.

“Unto Allah belongs whatsoever is in the heavens and the earth. Allah encompasses everything”. (4:126).

The Islamic doctrinal view that the human society had progressed from the instinct-based primitive stage to the stage of reason and reflection expresses the Islamic concept of human society, as expressed in the Qur’an.

“Mankind was one community and Allah sent unto them prophets and bearers of good”. (2:213).

“Mankind was but one community then they differed”. (10:19).

The Islamic doctrinal belief holds that ownership of goods and properties is not the personal right of man. Instead it is delegated to him by virtue of his appointment as vicegerent of God. This reflects the specific Islamic concept about a particular legislation related to the establishment of the institution of private ownership. According to the Islamic idea, assets belong to Allah in their entirety. God from time to time appoints individuals as His vicegerents for the management of the assets.

By this, the philosophy states that man’s right to a property is a right, which he holds by virtue of a legislative act that appoints him to the position of vicegerency of God. In this respect he only holds it as a trust from God.

The conceptions have different perspectives, the Islamic interpretation of the universe and its phenomena, the society and its relationships (between its parts), or any of the established precepts of law. It is on this account that they are not included in the principles in a direct manner. Notwithstanding this, some aspects of these conceptions that are connected with the economic life and its phenomena or with the established legal precepts of Islam will be of use to us in our search for the economic doctrine of Islam.

In order to clarify the part, which this aspect of the conception plays in determining the landmarks of the Islamic economic doctrine, we should anticipate the results that the following discussions will reveal later and borrow from the two conceptions that enter into the process of the discovery of the Islamic economic doctrine, which is the subject matter of the study of this book.

The first of these two conceptions is the Islamic philosophy about assets whereby Allah appointed a group of people as His vicegerent (trustee) over the natural assets and wealth and established rules on personal ownership, within which an individual can exercise the mandates of vicegerency pertaining to the development of the assets (mal) entrusted to him, their protection and their employment in the interest of man and for his welfare. Therefore, ownership is an operation an individual carries out on behalf of the society and on his own account within the society.

The other conception, drawn in advance by us from the future discussion is the view of Islam concerning exchange or trading as one of the phenomena of economic life. The Islamic view is that trading, by its original nature, constitutes a branch of production and whenever a merchant sells the products of another person he thereby actually participates in the process of production.

Production, in reality, is always a process that produces utility and service, not physical product. Material or substance cannot be created anew. The preparation and processing of the product - in a new form until the point of delivery to consumers – are all considered part of production. Rather, the product has no utility value (for the intended use) from the perspective of the consumers without all the processes it undergoes. Any trade transaction involving the product, which is distant from its true and rightful preparation process, is considered a disruptive operation, intended only for the respective beneficiary and results only in the extending of the distance between the product and its consumers. It is an irregular tendency that deviates from the original function of exchange and trading.

Let us defer the Islamic understanding of these two conceptions and its elaborate elucidation to an appropriate place in this book and present it as favorably as necessary to explain the part they play in our search for the Islamic economic doctrine, even though it will be a little repetitive. This will help us to fully comprehend and determine - in light of the outline of these two Islamic conceptions - the role that such notions play in the search process. These are some conceptions that play their parts - by shedding light on some of the precepts of Islamic civil rules and regulations – in helping us to understand the rules from legal texts, in which they are expressed, as well as in overcoming the obstacles in doing so.

The first of these two conceptions is the philosophy about the institution of private ownership, as we have mentioned a while ago. It prepares the mind such that it is ready to accept the texts of Islamic law, which restricts the right of the owner of an asset in conformity with the demands of the general well-being and interest of the society. Ownership of an asset, according to this notion, is a social function that the legislator entrusts to an individual so that he may share the responsibility of khilafah (vicegerency) on earth, with which Allah has honoured man. Ownership is not a personal, unconditional and unrestricted right.

Therefore, the rights in owning an asset are subordinated to the requirements and obligations under this institution of khilafah. It is easy in light of this to accept the texts that restrict the power and authority of an owner over an asset he holds, and even those that sanction its seizure from its owner (nationalization) in certain situations. Texts of Islamic law about land state that it should be taken from the him who owns and holds it, and be handed over to someone else if the former fails to cultivate the land productively or if he fails to deal with the land in such a way that conforms to the requirements under his vicegerency.

As these texts violate the sanctity of the institution of private ownership, Muslim scholars of Islamic law, are of two minds about accepting these texts. However, it is obvious that had these scholars viewed those texts with a perspective that is in line with the Islamic conception about the institution of private ownership, it would not have been difficult to accept them and respond to the underlying idea and spirit. By this we know that the Islamic thoughts in the economic sphere assume the form of an ideal and their adoption is necessary to give a complete and definite shape to the legislative texts from Islamic traditions, and to facilitate in understanding them. We find that some of those legislative texts are in precise conformity with this line of thought.

They embraced these conceptions or framework, in spelling the rules under the Islamic law. It is mentioned in the tradition, in the case of land and its ownership by man; ‘‘the land belongs to Allah, the Supreme. He has handed over to His servants (men) to hold it in trust. So he who leaves it lying idle and uncultivated for three consecutive years without any reason, it should be taken from him and be given to someone else’’.

In the description of the rule for confiscation of a land from its owner, and the basis for the seizure we see that the tradition had invoked a particular conception regarding ownership of land and the role of the individual in relation to that ownership.

Some Islamic conceptions establish the basis for developing rules in Islam to fill the lacuna in law - gaps in the legal provisions - by authorising the ruler to address the legal needs. An example is the Islamic conception concerning trading as mentioned before. The conception is a good basis for the state to exercise authority in regulating commerce so as to prevent - within the limits of its capabilities – any attempt at separating the exchange of goods from their production by making the respective trade activities as processes that extend the passage between the commodity and its final consumer. This view is in contrast to that the exchange or trading process as an independent step to facilitate procurement of the commodity by its consumers.

So, the Islamic conception either sheds light on the general legislative texts or provides the state with the authority to regulate in the economic sphere, by which any possible legislative gaps are addressed.

Legislative Gaps In The Economic Sphere

When we mention legislative gap in the economic sphere, we must assign it great significance during our search for the economic doctrine, as the gap represents a limb of the Islamic economic doctrine. In fact, the Islamic economic doctrine comprises two limbs. One limb is definite and final - in a complete form - with no possibility for change or modification. The other limb constitutes the legislative gap. Islam grants mandate to the ruler (Wali’ Al-Amr) or the ruling authorities to address the situations in accordance with the demands of the general goals of Islamic economics and the expediency required in the respective era.

Now when we speak of the legislative gap, we mean the gap as related to the Islamic legislation and its legislative texts, not as it is related to the practical situation of the Islamic community during the Prophet’s time. The honorable Prophet filled that gap to attain the goals of Islamic law in the economic sphere in light of the conditions and the circumstances the Islamic society was in at the time. However, when the Prophet set out to fill this gap, he did not do that his capacity as a prophet as one who promulgated the divine law. That is unchangeable and constant for all places and age.

His actions in this respect were not in the manner of implementing permanent and unchangeable laws. He did it in his capacity as a ruling authority (Wali’ Al-Amr), with the Islamic duty of filling the gaps in the prevailing set of laws, in accordance with the expediency of the circumstances of that time. From this we wish to deduce these conclusions.

First, the foundation of the Islamic economic doctrine cannot be accomplished without considering the legislative gaps – and the mandate for the state to address these gaps - in the search process. An assessment of the scope of this legislative gap (in the early days of Islam) as well as the exercise of the mandate granted to address the relevant situations – as an instrument of Shari’ah in achieving the goals of Islamic economics - is a critical part of our search process. Neglecting this tantamount to diminishing the scope and capability of Islamic economics that is by considering only the formal aspects and ignoring its essence.

Second, the type of rules that the prophet implemented to fill the gaps was not injunctions of permanent nature. The Prophet did not issue them in his capacity as the promulgator of the permanent and fixed laws, but in his position being a ruler and guardian of the Muslims. Therefore, they cannot be considered as a permanent part of the economic doctrine of Islam. Yet they throw light, to a great extent, on the (required) actions in filling the gaps that must be carried out every time according to the expediency of the circumstances. It also makes it easier to understand the primary goals that the Prophet adopted in his economic policy. This would facilitate similar measures by the states in later periods.

Third, the Islamic economic doctrine on this basis is completely associated with the political system that was in practice. When there is no ruler or ruling system that enjoyed the same qualifications and legitimacy that the Prophet did - in his capacity as a ruler (and not in his capacity as a Prophet) - there would be little chance of the legislative gaps being addressed in line with genuine Islamic goals. As such it would not be possible for us to identify the true Islamic economic doctrine (on this basis alone) that we may reap its results and realize its goals.

As this book is about the economic doctrine, its scope does not include issues concerning the system of government in Islam and the legitimate person or the appropriate governing authority to succeed the Prophet, and holding the office of his authority (wilayah) or to his qualifications as a ruler (not as a Prophet). We will also not discuss the conditions that must be fulfilled in the case of such an individual or authority.

All these are extraneous to the discussions of this topic. So for the purpose of the discussion of this book we will ensure that we make reference to a legitimate ruler, allowed by Islam as having forthwith the qualifications of the Prophet in his capacity as a temporal ruler. We will avoid from making deductions from practices by the state - when it was led by other personalities after the Prophet’s era - in response to the legislative gaps. Only then we could see the genuine Islamic doctrine and appreciate its goals and results.

But why is it that a legislative gap in the Islamic economic system, left to the discretion of the state authority on behalf of Islam from the very beginning. And what is that thought which justifies the existence of this void in the economic system, granting mandate over the matter to the ruler? And subsequently, what are the limits of the legislative gaps, in light of the indications of Islamic jurisprudence? We will provide the answer to all these, God willing, in our coming discussions.

The Process Of Ijtihad And Its Subjectivity

We have so far learned that the tools we have in our search for the Islamic economic doctrine are the Islamic legal rules and certain Islamic conceptions. Now it is the time for us to describe the method by which we can acquire those legal rules (ahkam) and the conception and the risks in employing that method. As it is by way of the Islamic rules and conceptions that we can discuss the Islamic economic doctrine, it is natural that we find out how we can identify these rules and conceptions themselves.

The answer to this question would be this: We will find these rules and conception directly in the Islamic texts, which comprise a particular Islamic legislation or a particular Islamic point of view. All that we will have to do, therefore, is to obtain texts from the Qur’anic verses and the sunnah3 of the Prophet, so as to compile a number of such Islamic ahkam (rules or law) and conceptions, by which we can eventually reach the general economic doctrinal theories.

Nevertheless it is not as simple as merely collecting the texts. More work needs to be done, for usually the texts do not display their legal or conceptional contents in an explicit and definite manner such that there is no ambiguity. On the contrary, in many cases the content is hidden or they reveal diverse and poorly arranged points. Under these circumstances, understanding of the text and the discovery of the definitive contents of the text are carried out by ijtihad4, and not an act based on plain common sense. We will not attempt to point out to the nature of this process, its juristic principle norms (rules) and modes. These all are outside the scope of the present subject. We only want to state - in light of ijtihad - facts about the Islamic economic doctrine and to caution against the dangers that we may fall into while carrying out of the process of discovery.

The fact is that the form of the economic doctrine, which we would arrive at, will depend upon the Islamic (economic) rules and Islamic (economic) conceptions. But inasmuch as these rules and conceptions depend upon the results of a particular ijtihad in understanding the text - from which these rules and conception are sourced - and the method of arranging these text and putting them together, they will be a reflection of a particular ijtihad. Thus it cannot be decided with finality that the form that we arrive at is the actual form of Islamic economic doctrine since it is possible to have errors in ijtihad.

Therefore, it is possible that different mujtahids – those who exercise ijtihad - may present different forms of Islamic economic doctrine in accordance with their respective ijtihads. All these forms will be considered as forms of Islamic economic doctrine because they represent the exercise of the ijtihad, which is allowed and acknowledged by Islam. They also represent patterns and norms (rules), which have developed. In this way, as long as the forms arrived at are outcomes of a legally valid ijtihad, they will be deemed as Islamic forms, irrespective of the extent of their conformity with the true economic doctrine of Islam.

This is the fact of the matter. As far risks arising from the basis of the ijtihad in deriving the ahkam (rules of law, regulations or ordinances) and the conceptions from the (legislative) texts of the Qur’an and sunnah in relation to the search of the economic doctrine, it is best to eliminate any subjective and personal elements creeping into the process of ijtihad because the more objective the approach is, the more accurate and successful will the results be. But if some personal or subjective elements were incorporated into the exercise of the ijtihad - in the understanding of the text - the inquiry will lack integrity and the discovery will not be genuine and reliable.

The risks will be escalated in situations whereby very long gap and a significant disparity in circumstances separate the mujtahid and the texts he uses in his ijtihad. It is particularly risky when the texts are in connection with the treatment of issues that actually exist in the life the mujtahid. He now confronts the matter as an actual reality in relation to the treatment of similar matters, while the situations greatly differ from those in the texts. Texts connected with the social sides are part of this category.

In relation to the search for the Islamic economic doctrine, the danger of subjectivity in the exercise of ijtihad would be greater compared to that in the exercise of ijtihad related to other rules on personal actions - such as the directives as to the purification of najasaat (impurities) or the prohibition of weeping during the salat (Islamic prayer) or the obligation of the disobedient as to tawbah (repentance, turning to God).

Because of the significant risk of subjectivity in the exercise of ijtihad, in respect of the process of the discovery of the Islamic economic doctrine, it is incumbent upon us to clarify this point and specify the sources of the risks. In this connection, we can mention the following four factors as the main source of that risk:

a) Attempting to justify the prevailing reality.
b) Incorporation of the text into a specific framework.
c) Separation of the legal (Shari’ah) evidence from its conditions and circumstances.
d) Adoption of a pre-conceived view towards the texts.

Attempts To Justify The Prevailing Reality

This is the action involving an effort by the mujtahid to develop an interpretation and to construe a text to justify a fasid (defective) reality that prevails in the social environment that he is living in. It doesn’t matter whether he is driven to do this intentionally or otherwise. He considers it as an inescapable necessity of the existing reality confronting him, as do some other Muslim thinkers. Like the others, he had succumbed to the prevailing social reality in which he was living and tried to adapt the nass (text) to the reality that he was in, instead of figuring out how to change the reality on the basis of the nass (text).

For instance, he reinterprets the grounds for the unlawfulness of usury and profit and so derived therefrom a conclusion that fits in with the fasid reality. It may go like this: Islam allows interest (on loans) provided it is not doubled and compounded. Islam prohibits it only when it reaches an unreasonable amount as is stated in the holy verse:

“Oh you who believe, devour not usury doubled and multiplied. Observe your duty to (fear) Allah that you may be successful” (3:130).

And the ‘reasonable limits’ are the limits, which the mujtahid finds in the living reality of his life and his society. In fact, it is the prevailing reality of his life, which prevents him from comprehending the object of the verse, which is not intended to allow usury at ‘mild’ rates (instead of doubled and compounded). The verse instead seeks to draw the attention of the usurer to the horrible consequences of usury, when it reduces the debtor to the abject conditions of being burdened with a heavy debt incurring usurious charges, resulting in continuous increase of the usurious principal, accompanied by the mounting usury of the debt leading him to a financial disaster.

Had this mujtahid sincerely intended to live up to the spirit and teaching of the Holy Qur’an - away and free from the promptings of the actual life of his society and its delusions - he would have read and understood from the dictum of Allah the Supreme, in this verse:

“If ye do it not, Take notice of war from Allah and His Messenger: But if ye turn back, ye shall have your capital sums: Deal not unjustly, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly.” (2:279).

That it was not a declaration of war against a certain type of usury common in the age of ignorance, which multiplied the debt. But it is a question of an economic doctrine (system) holding a particular view as to the capital and that, which determines the justification of its increase. It is also about an economic doctrine that restricts the increase of the capital, however slight it is, apart from justifiable sources, just as it stipulates and requires the lender to be content with his principal. In that case he shall not wrong anyone, nor he shall be wronged.

Incorporation Of The Text Into A Specific Framework

This is when the text is studied in a non-Islamic framework, and this framework may have or may not have emerged from a prevailing social reality. Here, the mujtahid tries to understand the text within that particular framework, and when he finds that it does not fit the picture, he skips it and moves to other texts that fit the given framework or at least do not contradict it. We have already seen how texts that curtail the power of an asset owner - which at times permit its seizure - were set aside and other texts were preferred simply because those texts do not agree with the intellectual framework which upholds the sanctity of the private ownership to such a degree as to place it above all other considerations.

A jurist commented on the text which states that the land whose owner does not cultivate it be taken away from him by the Wali’ Al-Amr or the administrator, and be given to another person to be cultivated on behalf of the community. He wrote that it had better not be implemented since it is contrary to the principles and grounds of reasoning. By grounds of reasoning he meant the thoughts that affirm the sanctity of the private ownership, when it is this sanctity and its priority that should have been derived from the law (Shari’ah) instead.

That is the meaning of making a deduction in a framework borrowed (from outside Islam), when it was already established beforehand and was in a form that makes it possible for the legislative text to be understood in its own particular way. If that were not so, then what is that rational argument for holding the sanctity of private ownership so supreme as to prevent the acceptance of the aforementioned legislative text? Is private ownership anything more than a relationship subsisting between the individual and the property? And is the social relationship merely taken for granted and is it as if it was legally ordained by the society or any other law given to achieve a particular goal? As such it enters neither in the province of deductive reasoning nor that of inductive inquiry.

In a field like this, as to the unlawfulness of the seizure of a property, we find many mujtahids inferring from a mode of interpretive reasoning that usurpation is intellectually an abhorrent or odious act. But this mode of reasoning is inept for usurpation is not a rightful a seizure of a property. It is an unauthorized act. It is the law that determines whether a seizure is rightful or otherwise. So we should derive a rule without imposing a preconceived notion on the text. If it is decided that the seizure is wrongful (unauthorized), then it is usurpation. And if the right of seizure were established, the seizure would not be usurpation and consequently is not an abhorrent act.

Another faqih (jurist) using an interpretative mode of reasoning in respect of the legislation of private ownership of land had written:

‘‘Requirement calls for it and accentuates the need for it. As man is unlike beasts and is by nature a civil being, he must have an abode to take shelter in, and a place exclusively belonging to him to live in. So unless it (private ownership) were made legal, it would result in great hardships, rather an unbearable burden.”

Of course, all of us admit that there exists the institution of private ownership in Islam, especially in respect of land. But the thing which we do not admit, however, is that the Islamic legal ruling draws upon the idea of private property from its historical roots, as it happens to be the case with this jurist whose intellectual horizon and conceptions of the past, present and future do not extend beyond the orbits of history in which the institution of private ownership existed.

Behind each appropriation in the history of man, he finds an image of the private ownership, which justifies and explains it, so much so that he has become unable to distinguish between the reality and its mere shadow. He has been conditioned to believe that as long as man requires appropriation of a residence that he may take shelter in, it is required that the man should own a private property so that it may belong to him exclusively and in which he may take shelter.

Had the mujtahid been able to distinguish between a man’s having a residence belonging to him and his possessing that residence as a private property of his own, he would not have been deceived by the historical implications of these two situations. It would have then been possible for him to perceive clearly that what would have resulted in a severe difficulty to the man is preventing him from having a house that belongs exclusively to him. Merely depriving him of private ownership of that house does not cause him that hardship. For students in settlement near a university or for individuals in a communist society, each one of them has a residence to himself in which he dwells without private ownership. Thus we find that our faqih (jurist) has unintentionally acquired - from the grandeur and history of the private ownership institution - those perceptions that shaped his thinking and idea of humanity’s need for private ownership, eventually becoming a framework for his juristic thinking.

Among the intellectual frameworks that play a significant role in the process of understanding of the texts, is the framework of language. While the basic word in the text is actually attached to history, its meaning - read in present day - has evolved throughout the passage of time and adopts a new dimension. In such a case it would be normal for the mujtahid to mistakenly understand the word in its present day meaning, and not based on its significance in a distant history. It is possible that the word may have acquired this meaning quite recently as a result of a new doctrine or an evolving civilization. For this reason, it is necessary to be extremely cautious in determining the meaning of the word. Otherwise it gets incorporated in the present day linguistic framework, which had not existed at the time the use of the word started.

The factor of the social conditioning on the word ‘proprietorship’ may have partly prevented mujtahids from the correct understanding of the text. Even when the word may have retained its original meaning in spite of the long passage of time, in the course of specific social dressings it becomes associated with a particular idea or practice conditioned to that idea or practice. So much so that at times the psychological sense of the word – because of such conditioning - result in a particular social perception exceeding the boundaries of the word’s original linguistic sense.

At the least, the linguistic dimension of the word may have become amalgamated with the psychologically conditioned dimension - which in fact is a result of the social environment in which the mujtahid lives - more than what is projected by the word itself. Take, for example, the word ‘socialism’. The word has become - during the present day socialist doctrines of socialism - the living experience of contemporary man conditioned to a mass of thoughts, values and practices. And this mass to a certain extent constitutes an important part of its present day social sense, even though on the purely linguistic level it bears nothing in the sense of this mass. It is similar in the case of the word ‘subject’. The history of feudalism has driven into it significant influence and has conditioned it with the sense of feudal behaviour of the landlord towards the serfs who cultivated his land for him.

So when we come across the word ‘socialism’ or texts which contain the word ‘socialism’ or the word ‘subject’ like a text which states that the people have joint shares in ‘water’, ‘fire’, and ‘grass’, or when we come across a text which states that ‘the lord (wali) has a right over the ‘subject’, we face the danger of responding to the social conditionings of these words and attach to it the social meanings which existed in a time so distant from the climate that prevailed at the time of the text, instead of giving it the actual linguistic meaning that it carried.

Separation Of The Legal (Shari’ah) Evidence (Ground) From Its Condition And Circumstances

Separating a legal ground from the circumstances and the environment it was applied in tantamount to extending the legal ground without an objective justification. This act is often perpetrated on a particular type of legal grounds and these grounds are those to which the jurist applies the name ‘at-taqrir’. In view of the fact that such grounds significantly impact the process of ijtihad performed in respect of the precepts and conceptions which are connected with the Islamic economic doctrine, it is necessary that we highlight the danger that results from separating a legal ground from its conditions and circumstances.

Let us first explain the meaning of the term at-taqrir. At-taqrir is one of the expressions of the holy practice (as-sunnat ush-Shari’ah). It means the silence of the Prophet or Imam in regard of a particular action which takes place in his presence or which comes to his knowledge. His silence reveals his at-taqrir or tacit consent (approval) and implies its validity in Islam.

At-Taqrir is of two types. In some situations, it will constitute a taqrir for a particular action, which an individual carries out. An example is when a person drank alcohol in the presence of the Prophet and the Prophet kept silent. The silence on the part of the Prophet would indicate the permission of drinking alcohol in Islam. In other situations, it will constitute a taqrir for a common action, frequently carried out by the people in their usual life. For instance, when we learn that it was a usual practice of the people - during the era of the formation of the Islamic legislations - to extract mineral deposits from the earth and to possess and own the output on the basis of their efforts in having extracted these mineral deposits.

That the Shari’ah is silent and does not object to this usual practice, is considered a taqrir or approval in respect of that practice and will constitute a ground for Islam’s sanction for individuals to extract mineral deposits from the earth and own them. It is to this that the name al-‘urful-‘am or suratul-‘uqlaiyyah (common usage or practice of the common people) is applied in Islamic legal discussions.

Recourse to at-taqrir actually reveals the Shari’ah’s agreement with a practice that was common during the period of Shari’ah legislative formation by the absence of prohibition against the practice. The rationale is that if the Shari’ah did not agree with such practice, it would have been forbidden. So the absence of the Shari’ah prohibition against it is evidence of its permissibility.

This mode of reasoning depends upon a number of factors. First, the prevalence of that practice during the period of Islamic legislative formation should be established with historical certainty. If it is found that the practice were indeed common in a later period, then the silence of the Shari’ah in respect of that practice would not constitute its approval. The practise must therefore have been common during the same period of the Shari’ah legislative formation.

Second, the absence of any prohibition by the Shari’ah of that practice should be established with certainty. Unless the researcher has completely established the absence of any prohibition issued in respect of the practice, he has no right to declare Islam’s sanction of that practice, since it is still probable the Shari’ah might have prohibited it.

Third, all the circumstances and conditions must be objectively verified by a personal observation since it is possible that some of these circumstances and conditions may have influenced the sanction of that practice or its disapproval. When we have systematically and precisely specified all the circumstances and conditions surrounding that practice during the period of Islamic legislative formation, it will be possible for us to discover from the Shari’ah’s silence, its approval of that practice given precisely similar conditions and circumstances.

Now in light of this explanation, we will be able to understand how a personal subjective element creeps into this space, exemplifying the separation of the practice from its actual circumstances and conditions. This separation takes two forms. Sometimes the mujtahid finds that he is living in a society in which a particular economic order prevails. He clearly perceives the practice so entrenched with a deep-rooted origin. He becomes oblivious to the factors that brought the practice come into existence, and the temporal circumstances and conditions that contributed to its emergence.

He is therefore led to think that this practice was so well established in the past and must have come down historically from the Islamic legislative formation era. In fact, it actually emerged later from some particular conditions and circumstances, or at least it probably came into existence that way. As an example, we may consider production works in the mining industry under a capitalistic system. The reality today is that of a well-established practice of production whereby a capitalist hire labourers to extract mineral materials - like salt and oil - and pay them wages. The ownership of the material extracted is his, by virtue of the production enterprise he operates.

The employment contract between the capitalist and the labourers in present day practice appears so natural - in terms of the contents and implications - that it is possible for a large number of people to think that this type of contracts is similar with those in the old days. They may even assume that it is as old as the beginning the mining industry. On the basis of that assumption, they therefore hold that this type of employment arrangement must have already existed during the Islamic legislative formation era. It is thus quite natural to end up having such idea and using it as an argument for the validity of this type of employment contract - that results in ownership the extracted material by the capitalist - on the ground of at-taqrir. It may be said that the Shari’ah’s silence and non-prohibition of this type of employment arrangement constitutes a ground for Islam’s approval of such arrangement.

We do not want to say anything in respect of this arrangement and its requisites from the juristic point of view, nor about the dicta of the jurists, who entertain doubt as to its legal soundness according to Islamic principles. We will examine the ruling of the law (al-hukm-ush-shar‘i) in respect of this type of arrangement and its requisites with elaborate details at a later stage. We will then present all the arguments that are possible to cite as authoritative grounds for and against it.

Here we only want to examine the deductions with respect to such arrangement on the ground of at- taqrir in order to demonstrate the habit of separating Shari’ah-sanctioned practice from the (original) conditions and circumstances. Now those who infer - on the ground of at-taqrir - that it is legally valid and sound to employ workers and claim ownership of the mining output, did not actually live in the Islamic legislative formation era so as to be certain of the prevalence of this practice in that age.

They witnessed its prevalence only in their actual life and in the climate they lived in. It’s being firmly rooted in the economic system and social order in which they lived, led them to believe that it was a general phenomenon extending down historically from the Islamic legislative formation age. This is what we mean by the separation of a practice from the conditions and circumstances it was prevalent, without an objective justification.

If it were not so, do we truly have a ground to say that this type of employment arrangement in mining did exist and was widely prevalent in the era of the formation of Islamic legislative? And to those who are so convinced of its existence in that age, do they know that such arrangement is actually a regular manifestation of capitalist production practice? Are they aware that historically it was not practised on a large scale? Or that it was not geographically widespread, especially in industrial field, except at a later date?

However this statement does not mean denial of the existence of the capitalist-style production of the minerals - the practice of their extraction by hired labour, with the output owned by the employer - in the era of Islamic legislative formation. Nor is it an endorsement of the practice. It merely expresses a doubt in respect of this being the case. That is to say, that how a particular phenomenon becomes so entrenched and appears so natural as to lead to the conviction that it was deep-rooted in the past. It is chronic simply because it is ingrained in the living reality without its complete historical facts.

This is the first form of the abstractive process, the separation of the real life practice from its actual conditions and circumstances and projecting its historical extension to the era of Islamic law formation.

The other form of the abstractive process takes place whenever we study a wrongful act that was occasionally sanctioned during era of the Islamic legislative formation and we attempt to deduce its permissibility, on the ground of Shari’ah’s silence. Under this circumstance, the mujtahid is likely to fall into the error of abstraction whenever he takes the sanction for the act out from its circumstances. He thereby isolates the factors that may have a part in its permissibility and proceeds to generalize it with the dictum that this practice is sound and valid in Islam under all circumstances.

By right, for an inference based on at-taqrir to be objective, it is necessary that we include into our consideration all circumstances which are likely to affect Islam’s standpoint in respect of that act, since whenever some of those circumstances and conditions change, the inference based on at-taqrir becomes invalid. For example, you are told that drinking liquor is lawful in Islam on the ground that a particular person drank it when he fell ill, during the time of the Prophet and the Prophet did not forbid his from doing so. In reply to this you can say that this ground of at-taqrir for an isolated case is not a sufficient basis to argue that Islam approves drinking of liquor for everybody even when he is in sound health, as it is possibly permissible in case of some illnesses.

Liquor may be allowable in exceptional situation, and therefore it is a mistake to isolate an incident - even one that happened during the Islamic legislative formation era - from its actual environment, with specific conditions and circumstances. It is wrong to generalize the legal ruling in respect of every similar act without proper justification, because the legal ruling differs when circumstances differ. We should rather consider very thoroughly all individual circumstances and social aspects surrounding the practices in the legislative formation era.

Approaching The Texts With Preconceived View

By this, we mean the researcher’s own disposition towards the issue. The inclination would significantly affect his understanding of the texts. In order to clarify this, we may suppose two persons studying the texts. One of them is inclined towards discovering the social side and whatever is connected with that aspect in terms of the Islamic precepts and concepts. The other is drawn by his own inclination towards discovering the precepts, which are connected with specific practice of the individuals.

These two persons, although they directly deal with the same texts, will derive different results. Each will arrive at results which would be more in keeping with his own disposition and his particular point of view, and is likely to remain blind towards other aspects even those right before his eyes, but towards which he has no inclinations. The effect of such preconceived ideas - which in reality is a subjectivity of the mujtahid, instead of adhering to objectivity in his study of the texts - is not confined merely to concealing of some of the outstanding legislative landmarks from his view.

At times, it leads him astray in the understanding of the legal texts and to errors in the deduction of legal rules from them. This happens to be the case when mujtahid wants to impose his preconceived ideas. In such a case he will not reach a correct understanding of the text. Instances like this are numerous in Islamic jurisprudence. The case of the prohibition of surplus water and pasture by the Prophet is one of the most obvious examples of how far ijtihad may be affected by the disposition of the mujtahid.

It is stated in the tradition that the Prophet made a ruling for the inhabitants of Medina concerning (the use of well water for) date palms whereby no one was allowed to deprive others of surplus water. He also made a ruling for the desert dwellers, forbidding them from withholding surplus water or selling surplus pasture. This interdiction by the Prophet forbidding the withholding of surplus water and pasture may be construed as general rule of the Shari’ah applicable at all times and in all places, just like the prohibition of gambling and liquor.

But it may also be construed as a specific legal measure that the Prophet took in his capacity as a Wali’ Al-Amr (ruler), who was responsible for the welfare of his Muslim subjects within the limits of his authority and qualification as a ruler. As such it will not be an absolutely binding general law of the Islamic Shari’ah, instead merely an ordinance connected with the prevailing circumstances and experience as assessed by a ruler. The discussion in regard to this text of the tradition of the Prophet imposes upon the researcher the duty of considering both possibilities and determining which one of them is relevant, in light of the text or similar texts.

As for those with a preconceived idea in approaching a text, they take it upon themselves from the very beginning to find in every text the general rule of the Islamic law and to always look vis-à-vis the texts at the Prophet in his capacity as the promulgator of the general laws of Islam, overlooking his role in his capacity of a ruler. As such they will explain the aforementioned text on the basis of it’s being a general rule of the Shari’ah, binding in all times and all places5.

This specific point of view does not spring from the text itself, but results from the mental habit as to his perception and his mental image of the Prophet. The mujtahid is led to this attitude, having always been accustomed to view the Prophet in his capacity as the promulgator of his prophetic mission. He is blinded to the Prophet’s other identity, as a ruler of the community. He is consequently also blinded to this identity, as represented in different texts.

Occasional Need For Subjectivity

However we must point out the area, within which the subjective side is allowed when attempt is made at formulating the definitive general idea in respect of Islamic economics. It is the part in choosing the form intended to be adopted for the Islamic economics among those forms that represent legitimate juristic ijtihads. We have been already told that the discovery of the Islamic economic doctrine is accomplished through the process of ijtihad by construing the meaning of the texts, reconciling them and consolidating their implications.

We have learnt that ijtihads differ and vary from one mujtahid to another because of the differences among them in understanding the meanings of the texts and in the method of handling the contradictions that may appear between some of the texts. They also differ in respect of the general rules and patterns of the juristic thinking. We also learned that ijtihad enjoys a legal status and an Islamic stamp of approval as long as it pursues its function, depicts its form and retains its parameters within the framework of the Holy Book and the sunnah of the Holy Prophet and in accordance with the required terms and conditions.

This variations resulted in the growth and development of a diverse set of ideas and understanding in respect of the Islamic economics, all of them shar‘i and Islamic. It is a case whereby we can choose in every part the most effective ingredients and those of the strongest form, for dealing with the socio-economic problems and for the realization of the highest of goals of Islam. This is a space for personal choice, in which the researcher is free to exercise his opinion. But he is free only in his capacity as a discoverer and it does not grant him freedom beyond the orbit of differences in ijtihads.

The author of this book made use of this space for the subjective personal choice in his research efforts herein, before this and also after in the foreword, as alluded to by him of the author’s ijtihad deductions in matter of juristic law6. But not all the precepts the author has presented and adopted in this book - and those precepts he sourced guidance from - are the outcome of his own ijtihad. On the contrary, in some matters he has presented the precepts that do not agree with his own ijtihad, as long as they express deductions of other ijtihads in the matter of juristic law viewpoints bearing the Islamic character and the shar‘i stamp.

In this connection I would like to state emphatically that the use of the space for subjective choice and the bestowal of the right of choice to practise within the general framework of ijtihad in respect of the Islamic common law constitutes a necessary condition - on the technical side - for the search for the Islamic economic doctrine. It is not merely a permission to relax the serious requirements and responsibilities related to task of ijtihad in respect of the precepts of Islamic law. This is so considering that under certain circumstances, the search for the comprehensive Islamic economic doctrine that is aligned with the essence of Islamic legislative provisions and their juristic ramifications is impossible except with some elements of subjectivity involved.

I say this based on my personal experience during the preparation of this book. Perhaps it is necessary to make it quite clear here in order to show one of the difficulties I had to undergo in my search of Islamic economic doctrine and the way I overcome it by using of the abovementioned space for personal choice, which grants the option. It is agreed among the present day Muslims that only a minority of the precepts of Islamic law has been well preserved, whereby their clarity, necessity and finality are agreed upon, notwithstanding the many centuries that separate us from the Islamic legislative formation age. Surely from among the body of the precepts we find in the juristic book, those that constitute this group that enjoys the status of absolute finality does not exceed five per cent.

Why is that so clear? The precepts of Islam are derived from the Holy Book and the sunnah of the Holy Prophet i.e. from the legal texts. The soundness of each one of these texts - with the exception of the Qur’anic texts and a small body of the texts of the sunan7 established as tawatur8 - depends upon the reliability of the transmission of one of its transmitters or the muhaddithun9.

We may carefully scrutinize the accounts about the transmitter and the level of his trustworthiness and faithfulness to his transmission. But we get acquainted with the integrity and the faithfulness of the transmitters by looking at history, not in a direct manner. There is therefore likelihood that the truthful transmitter, being fallible, might have misconstrued the text and transmitted it to us obliquely, especially in circumstances whereby the text reaches our hands only after passing through a number of transmitters. Each transmitter, in turn handed it down to the next till it reached us at the end of the long passage. We therefore cannot be absolutely certain of the soundness of the text.

But even when we have ascertained the soundness of the text and its authenticity as having come from the Prophet or an Imam, we still cannot comprehend that text except in the way we are living today. We are thus unable to fully assimilate the atmosphere and conditions as implied in the text and penetrate its milieu, which can throw light on it. By comparing the text with other legislative texts in order to reconcile them, we are also likely to make mistake in our mode of reconciliation and end up giving preference to one text over another, when the other one is indeed sounder.

There could even be an exception that exists in yet another text that has not reached us. Or perhaps we have ourselves overlooked the text of exception it in the course of our ijtihad. We thus adopted the former text, ignoring the text containing the exception, which could explains it and specify the conditions.

From these it follows that ijtihad is a complicated process. There are doubts and reservations confronted on all sides. Whatever conclusion a mujtahid has arrived at, his opinion plays a key part as a deciding factor. As such, its soundness cannot be invariably confirmed inasmuch as it is probable that the mujtahid may have made a mistake in reaching its conclusion on account of the flaws of the text. Even though it may have appeared sound to him, on account of his misunderstanding of the meaning of the text, or on account of the error in the way of he reconciled the text with the rest, or on account of his omission of some other relevant texts because of his oversight, or simply because of their non-availability after a long passage of time.

This does not in any way mean that the process of ijtihad is invalid or disallowed. Indeed in spite of the fact that it is associated with doubts and misgivings, Islam has allowed its practice and has fixed for the mujtahid the scope in which he can rely upon his presumptive opinion, within the rules formally expounded by the science of Usul al-Fiqh (principles jurisprudence). And there is no blame on him as long as he relies upon his opinion within the permitted limits, whether he end up being correct or otherwise.

In light of this it is obvious that for each mujtahid there would be a collection of errors in terms of views that inevitably contradict the true Islamic legislation. It is also clear that the correct Islamic rules - within the space of issues handled by the mujtahids – exist in a rather irregular pattern, due to differences of opinions among the mujtahids. A mujtahid may be incorrect in the first matter and correct in the second, while another mujtahid gets it right in the first and erroneous in the second.

In view of this, the researcher actually gets involved in the search efforts only when he proceeds in his search from the precepts established by a specific presumptive ijtihad, in order to go beyond these to what is more profound and more comprehensive Islamic economic theories and doctrine. But it is incumbent upon us to pose a question. Would the ijtihad of every mujtahid - the precepts he has gathered in a collection - necessarily reflect a perfect consolidated economic doctrine and premises, consonant with the structure of those precepts and their nature?

Our reply to this question would be in the negative, for the ijtihad by which the deduction of those precepts is made is exposed to the risk of errors. As long as that is the case, it is likely for the ijtihad of a mujtahid to add an external element to the Islamic practice. It is likely that a mujtahid may have been mistaken in his deduction or may have failed to find an Islamic legislative element because he was unable to correctly understand it.

It is also possible that the texts he was pursuing or the body of the precepts to which his ijtihad has led, may have become inconsistent for some reasons. It would become difficult in such a case to attain a perfect conceptual balance and unify them or reach a comprehensive doctrinal explanation that consolidates them all together into one integrated set.

It is on account of this, that we should make a distinction between the Islamic legislative realities - which the Prophet had enunciated - and its version as depicted by a particular mujtahid through his pursuit of the texts. However we believe that the reality of Islamic legislation in the sphere of economics is neither produced spontaneously nor is it born of views independent from one another. On the contrary, the Islamic reality in these spheres is built on a unified base with common and well-balanced conceptions. It emerges from the theories and general Islamic principles in the affairs of economic life.

It is our belief in this that makes us consider the precepts as the upper part of the structure that we should traverse to, the part that is more profound and comprehensive. Next we shall move down to the base of the structure, which expresses their generalities in elaborate detail and the ramifications in a consistent and coherent form. Were it not for our belief that the precepts of the Shari’ah are built upon unified fundamental principles, there would have been no justifiable reason for the pursuit of the economic doctrine.

All this is true with respect to the Islamic legislative reality. But as for the ijtihads of the mujtahids, it is not necessary that the precepts that those ijtihads had formulated reflect a complete economic doctrine or its comprehensive theoretical basis, when it is possible that the mujtahids commit errors. This would have resulted in either inserting an external element into the real Islamic legislation or omitting a true element from its true essence.

A single mistake in respect of the body of the precepts is sure to lead to the departure from the truth, adversely affecting the efforts and rendering it impossible to reach the true Islamic doctrines using those precepts. It is because of this that the researcher in pursuit of the economic doctrine faces a trying ordeal. It is the conflict between his capacity as a discoverer of the economic doctrine and his capacity as a mujtahid deducing the ahkam (the prescribed laws). This would be the case when we take it for granted that the body of ijtihad - to which he is led by his personal ijtihad - is unable to help him discover the economic doctrine.

Under these circumstances the researcher, in his capacity as a mujtahid – concerned with deducing those ahkam - is driven by the nature of his ijtihad to the choice of the ahkam that his ijtihad has led to. From there he has to set out on the path of discovering the economic doctrine. But in his capacity as a discoverer of the economic doctrine, it is incumbent upon him to choose a well-integrated body of ahkam - congruent in its directions and its theoretical significance – and with that, to be able to discover the doctrine. But when he does not find a set of ahkams as described – from those his personal ijtihad has led to - he finds himself obliged to choose another point of departure appropriate for the search exercise.

Let us give a clearer and more concrete form of the difficulty in the following example. A mujtahid observed that the texts link ownership of natural resources with work and labour, and reject their appropriation in any way other than work or labour. He found a single exception to these texts. It is in a text sanctioning - in some particular contexts - appropriation by a means other than work or labour.

To this mujtahid, deductions from the texts and their contributions will reveal a quandary because of the lack of direction. The root cause of this lack of direction is the existence of the text of exception. If not for that single text, he would have been able to discover on the basis of the body of the other texts that in Islam ownership is established on the basis of work. Faced with such dilemma and being in such a predicament, what shall the mujtahid do? How is he going to overcome this contradiction between his two roles - his capacity as a mujtahid concerned with the precepts of the Islamic law, and his capacity as a discoverer?

The mujtahid who faces this difficulty has to put up with two usual explanations for the irregularity and the lack of consistency among the ahkam, which his ijtihad leads him to. One explanation is that the text with the exception (that we used in the above illustration) is unsound, notwithstanding the fact that it meets the prescribed conditions, and is thus enjoined by Islam and is supposed to be complied with. The unsoundness of some of the texts introduces an external element in the body of the ahkam combined together by his ijtihad. It subsequently leads to disharmony between those ahkam at the theoretical level and in the process of the discovery of the economic doctrine.

The other explanation is that the apparent disharmony between the constituents of the collection is superficial. It only resulted from the researcher’s perceived inability to find the hidden unity between those constituents and their common theoretical explanation. Here the position of the mujtahid in his role as one who infers the precept of the laws of Islam is distinct from his standpoint in his other capacity as one pursuing the search for the Islamic economic doctrine.

In his capacity as one deducing the ahkam, he cannot ignore the resulting ahkam which his ijtihad directs him to - even though these ahkam appear to be logically undesirable at the theoretical level - so long as it is likely that this apparent undesirability arises from his inability to reach the evasive origin of the their doctrinal basis. But his adherence to these ahkam does not imply their finality. On the contrary, they are deduction of his presumptive opinion (zann) as long as they are established on his presumptive ijtihad, which justifies their adoption despite the possibility of error.

But when the jurist wishes to move from the domain of the jurist’s precepts to the domain of jurist’s theories and to pursue the exercise of discovering the Islamic economic doctrine, the nature of the exercise prescribes for him the type of precepts he should start from. It is imperative that the point of departure for him is a collection of well-integrated and mutually consistent precepts.

If he is able to find such a collection from the precepts his ijtihad had drawn together, and to set out from such starting point - without undergoing the difficulty of inconsistency and disharmony among the constituents of this collection - it will afford him a valuable opportunity to align his capacity as one drawing the ahkam of Shari’ah with his other role as a seeker of the doctrine. However, if he is not so fortunate to have such opportunity and if his ijtihad does not facilitate in getting him to a proper point of departure, that should in no way affect his resolution to carry out the search effort nor his conviction that a generally coherent theoretical description of Islamic reality is possible. The only course for him to follow in that case is to find help from the precepts that the ijtihad of other mujtahids have arrived at.

Since in every ijtihad there is a collection of precepts, which differs significantly from that in other ijtihads, it would not be logical to expect the discovery of the economic doctrine through each and every one of these collections. We only believe in the Islamic economic doctrine established on the basis of the existing ahkam of the Shari’ah, contained in these collections. So in case of a disharmony between the constituents of a collection – adopted in the ijtihad of the researcher - it is obligatory upon him to remove the elements that lead to contradictions and replace them with such deductions and precepts from other ijtihads, which are more consistent and will facilitate the search exercise.

He also needs to develop a coherent collection comprising the results of various ijtihads as the starting point for him to set out from, and eventually discover the doctrine that fairly represents the selected collection of ahkam of Shari’ah. The least that can be said in respect of this collection is that it will be in its entirety the truest and the most accurate picture of the Islamic legislative reality and its verity is not more improbable than the verity of other pictures that the surface of the juristic ijtihad ground is replete with.

Over and above this, it bears the legal Shari’ah legitimacy since it expresses the authorized Islamic ijtihads all of which revolve within the orbit of the Qur’an and the sunnah of the Prophet. On account of this, it is possible for the Islamic community to choose it for application and practice, from among many of the ijtihad forms of the Shari’ah, one of which must be chosen.

This is all that can be achieved in the search for the Islamic economic doctrine, when the personal ijtihad of the seeker is unable to formulate an appropriate point of departure for that exercise. However, this is also all that we at most need in this connection. What more do we need after we have discovered an economic doctrine, which enjoys the best of the ijtihad’s pictures - the truest and the most precise - in which all the Islamic requirements are satisfied, and being attributable to a sufficient number of mujtahids who performed it with Islamic sanction for application in actual life.

Misapplication Of Rules Deduced From Past Practices To The Present Realities

The economic doctrine of Islam entered the life of the Muslims in the era of the prophet and existed in real practice in the economic sphere of the Muslims society at the time. Because of this, it becomes possible for us - in our search for the Islamic economic doctrine - to examine and look for it at the level of its actual application, just as it is possible for us to study it and look for it at the theoretical level. Just as the texts on the theory define them in the sphere of Shari’ah (principles), the actual practice defines the features and characteristics of the Islamic economics.

However, the legislative texts on the (Islamic economic) theory are a better reflection of the doctrine than the actual practise because the application of the texts in a particular condition is not likely to reflect its rich content or its full social significance. The extent the practice inspires and contributes to the theory differs from the contribution of the texts themselves. This difference arises because it is normal for the researcher to overlook the fact that the practice is linked with specific and actual conditions at the relevant time.

An example of this oversight would be sufficient. To the mujtahid who intends to find out the nature of Islamic economics from its application during the early period of Islam, the practice then would reflect that Islamic economics was apparently capitalistic in nature – with elements of economic freedom and broad scope of private ownership and individual-centered activities. This is what some Muslims held explicitly, as the individual members of the society who lived in that period apparently had a free hand, faced no restrictions and were not under any compulsion in their economic activities. They apparently enjoyed the rights of private ownership over any of the natural resources that they could possibly had access to and the right to the income from their investment of these assets or the proceeds from their disposal. After all, capitalism is nothing more than this unrestrained freedom, which the members of the members of early Islamic society were apparently pursuing in their economic lives.

Some of those mujtahids added that to graft Islamic economics onto non-capitalist systems and to say that Islam is socialist in its economics - or carries socialistic and communist seeds within it - is not an unfair thing to do on the part of the mujtahid in his capacity as a mujtahid. In doing so he is joining the march of new thought, which has begun to frown upon capitalism and to reject it. He is actually preaching to refashion Islam to a form palatable within the parameters of that new thought.

I do not deny that the individuals of the society in the era of the Prophet pursued economic activities freely and had economic freedom to a considerable extent. And I do not disagree that this does reflect an apparently capitalistic face of Islamic economics. But this side, which we perceive when we look at some aspects of the economic practice, is not visible at all when we look at them during the study of the doctrine at the theoretical level.

It is true that to us the individuals who lived at the time of the Prophet seem to have enjoyed a great deal of freedom, which at times the mujtahid may be not able to distinguish from the capitalist-style freedom. But this acquired perception dissipates and fritters away when we turn from the practice to the theory as per the legislative texts.

This discrepancy between the practice and theory - notwithstanding the fact that each of them expresses one of the alternative forms of the other – lies concealed in the conditions the man of that era lived in, his (production) capabilities and the extent of his command over nature. The theoretical significance of its non-capitalistic dimension - in the sphere of actual practice – is hidden to the extent of man’s limited control over nature in that age.

As human capabilities grow and man gains more control over nature with various means, opening more fronts and broadening his range of operation, appropriation and exploitation of the natural resources, the non-capitalist essence of Islamic economic practice becomes more manifest. The contrast between the Islamic economic theory and that of the capitalist economics becomes more visible. Its non-capitalist essence comes to light in the solutions formulated by Islam to meet the new problems emerging with man’s growing dominance over nature.

As an example, in the time Islamic economics was applied, man mined salt or other substances, and extracted as much of the mineral material as he wished without any possibility of his appropriation of that material deposit or mine as his private property. Viewed with the theory that was prevalent then, there was nothing that was objectionable.

So what can this phenomenon, when it is separated from the study of the juristic and legislative text in a general way, reveal in the sphere of its application? It can reveal only the rule of the economic freedom in the society to a degree that resembled capitalist-style freedom with regard to ownership of the asset and whatever earnings it yielded.

But when we look at the theory through the text, we will find that it reveals an opposite sentiment to that reflected by the practice. The theory forbids private possession of salt or naphtha (petroleum) mines, and does not permit extraction of these materials more than the personal need of each individual. This explicitly contradicts capitalism, which embraces the principle of private ownership and opens wide rooms for the acquisition of natural resources and their profit-motivated, capitalist-style exploitation.

So can anyone apply an economic system that does not grant the freedom to own salt or petroleum mines, or disallow excessive extraction to the inconvenience of the others? Can anyone call such system capitalist economics? Or can he perceive it as a capitalist doctrine in the same the way as those who approach the subject by observing only the actual practice?

In that case we should understand that while man in that era - when the Islamic economic system was practised - had the freedom to work the mines, own the output and even derived profits from the salt and petroleum mines, yet because of his limited means and control over nature he was mostly unable to exploit the resources beyond the limits permissible by the theory. He had no ability to extract from the mine excessive quantities – on the same scale as today because he was not equipped against nature the way men of our time are.

Therefore, in reality he did not breach the limit that was set on the permissible quantity to extract. The simple reason for this is that whenever he wished extract more, he was not able to do so with his primitive instruments at his disposal. He was not in the position to extract a large quantity that would bring him great advantage without sharing the benefits of the mine with others.

However, the theory clearly shows the consequences of such practice and this contrast with the capitalist thinking is only reflected when man gains control over nature. His capacity to exploit nature grew and it became possible for a small number of men to work and exploit the whole salt mine, or find wells in the oil field and deliver the output extracted to buyers all over the globe for a large profit.

Likewise, we also see a similar scene in relation to the theory’s disapproval of private ownership over natural assets and resources, like woods in the forest, other than what a person can hold or produce with his own labour directly. The men in that era when Islamic economics was practised could not have had an explicitly clear sense of this theory as the work in that age was generally carried out by use of direct labour and whatever tools that was within their reach.

But it has now becomes possible to extract and obtain huge quantities from the mines with the use of machineries and sizable amounts of funds sufficient to defray the wages of the employed labourers. A person with such capabilities can employ labourers to extract and acquire possession of the natural resources on a massive scale.

This is what actually takes place in the real economy today when hired labour and capitalist-style production have become the common mode for the extraction and the acquisition of those natural resources. It is only in such situation that the contradictions between Islamic and capitalist economic theories manifest itself in a glaring manner. It would then be obvious to each researcher that Islamic economic theory is not of capitalist nature. Otherwise, it would not have any disagreement with the capitalist mode of acquiring natural resources.

Thus in the era of capitalist economy we could find a person with a big fleet of machineries and sizable funds hiring workers for large scale logging works. Aided by his access to logistical assets, he could transport massive quantities of output to the eagerly waiting markets for use in construction etc. If this man were to live the Islamic way of life, he would become aware of how much contradiction there is between the principle of economic freedom under Islam and that under capitalism. He will see that the Islamic economic theory would not sanction a capitalist-style logging operation, extracting massive quantities of wood and selling them at high prices.

So the whole face of the Islamic economic theory did not manifest during the era it was being practised, and man of that era did not have to test the limits of the theory in the problems he dealt with and in the economic activities he carried out. Its complete face is visible only through the texts in their definitive general forms.

However, those who hold the belief that Islam is capitalistic and grants economic freedom, do have some excuses for holding this belief. They drew inspiration for this perception from their study of man in the era when Islamic economics was applied, in particular the degree of economic freedom he apparently had. But this perception is untrue and misleading, for an inference from practice cannot be a substitute for input from the legislative and juristic texts, which reveals Islam’s non-capitalist essence.

In fact, the firm belief in the non-capitalist essence of the Islamic economic theory - in light of what we have stated - does not result from a new development. Nor does it come about from grafting or from a new personal contribution to the theory as alleged by those who believe that Islamic economics is capitalistic. They charged that the tendency to interpret Islamic economics as non-capitalistic is a deceitful attempt to introduce a foreign element in Islam by way of insincere compliment intended to advance the cause of the new thought and discredit capitalism for its doctrine of private ownership and economic freedom.

We have historical proof to repudiate this charge and to confirm the sincerity of the efforts in interpreting Islamic economics as non-capitalistic. The evidence is in the juristic and legislative texts, which are found in the historical sources that go back to hundreds of years before the modern world and the recent emergence of socialism with all their doctrines, notions and ideologies. But when we bring the non-capitalist face of Islamic economics into clear sight - as presented in this book - and affirm a clear line of demarcation between the Islamic and the capitalist doctrines, we do not intend to brand Islamic economics as socialistic and include it in the rank of socialist doctrines as opposed to capitalism.

The clash and the polarization existing between capitalism and socialism lead to the postulation of a third pole in this contention and allow Islamic economics in particular to occupy this central position of the third pole. By virtue of its features and dominion, Islamic economics fits the position in this contention between the two highly polarized economic doctrines. The contention permits the admission of a third pole in the field because socialism is not merely the negation of capitalism, such that in order to be socialism, it will suffice to deny capitalism. It is also a real and independent doctrine.

Socialism has its own ideas, conceptions and theories and it is not that these ideas, conceptions and theories are only right when capitalism is false. It is not that Islam has to be capitalistic if it is not socialist. The independence of Islamic economics is real at its roots. When we search for the Islamic economics doctrine, we cannot simply confine our process within the orbit of the specific contention between the capitalism and socialism. We must not locate the position of Islamic economics on either of these two poles such that we can describe it as socialistic if it is not capitalistic, or describe it as capitalistic if it is not socialistic.

The originality of Islamic economics will become strikingly clear in the following discussion. Islam opposes socialism’s hostility towards private ownership. Islam conditionally accepts the legitimacy of earnings through means other than labour from certain privately owned industries, while socialism considers any earning derived from privately owned production without direct labour input as unlawful

This in fact is the contradiction between the Islamic theory and socialist theory of economics and it is only from this starting point that all the contradictions between them manifest. This will become clearer and clearer as we will set to work on the details.

• 1. See Volume 1, Part 1 of Iqtisaduna. Foreword by the author.
• 2. Volume 1: The Scientific Laws of the Capitalist Economics are of Doctrinal Framework.
• 3. Sayings or traditions about the sayings and practices of the Prophets and Imams.
• 4. A complex process of arriving at independent legal opinions by applying human reasoning to ascertain the rules of Shari’ah Law.
• 5. They deduce on the basis of this that the prohibition is not an interdictory prohibition (nahy tahrim) but a reprehensive prohibition (nahy karahah) for they consider it improbable that the owner of the well is prevented from earning profit from his well-water for every time and in every place.
• 6. See the foreword by the author Vol. 1, Part 1.
• 7. The plural of sunnah.
• 8. Traditions narrated with numerous independent chains.
• 9. The scholars of traditions.