It would be more accurate to say that if a person acquires a natural asset for another person, its ownership will be transferred to the person for whom it is acquired, merely because it was intended for him, instead of relying on the basis of the hiring or the agency contract between him and the worker. It may be said that the evidence for the right of possession is a general practice (sirah), and is established on the acquirer’s right of possession, irrespective of whether the person himself or someone else did the work.

The acquirer’s right of possession not as being the acquirer so as to hinder what has been previously said (from the first side of previous appendix) that the acquirer is not the acquirer as a representative or the hirer, so as to oppose what has already been said from the two other sides of the preceding appendix, as to the fact that the contract of representation or hiring does not call for this.1

Therefore, if this is completed, the meaning will be that a person other the pursuer of the acquisition will become the owner of the acquired wealth in one (and only one) way, and it is the pursuer who intends its acquisition for him. But in no other way than this, a person other than the pursuer will become the owner of the acquired wealth and the acquirer of it, being his representative or his employee will not justify his right to the possession of it, because we have learnt that the validity of the representation in creative (takwin) matters requires a specific proof and that is absent here. The hire contract grants the hirer ownership over the work the hired person, not the object of the acquisition, that is, the acquired asset.

• 1. It may be observed on the basis of what was said in the preceding appendix that the hirer’s right of ownership to what his worker acquires is sufficient juridically as evidence for ownership by the hirer.

  It is argued that is because the worker is only a hired person, and the natural asset he obtained will thus not belong to him, even though he is the one who pursues the acquisition work. It was further argued that the proof (argument) that acquisition is the cause of ownership is only a customary local practice, because the traditions on this subject are weak in term of authenticity - and we do not know that the local customary practice during the era of legislative formation used to confer upon the hired worker ownership of the acquired natural wealth. Therefore, when the worker’s right to possession of acquired natural wealth is not established, it will make it definite that the hirer will be the owner.

  But this observation does not justify the hirer's ownership of the acquired natural asset. We acknowledge the absence of the proof for ownership of the hired worker. But failure to prove ownership by the worker does not at all mean that the ownership of his hirer is proven. We may possibly also add that this observation will not be dismissed in case of land rehabilitation, about which there exists a text to the effect that the land will belong to the person who revives it. There is ample proof in this case that the person who revives the land is entitled to a right of ownership. And here the person who revives the land is the hired worker. Thus according to the application of the text, he will be the rightful owner.