Whom Do We Imitate?
The jurisprudents stated several conditions which must be available in the reference, so that imitating him will be correct. These conditions are:
1- The Life: This condition means that the religiously responsible person must at the beginning of his religious responsibility refer to the still living reference. It is not permissible, according to the opinion of the prominent jurisprudents, to imitate the dead reference at the beginning of the journey of the religious responsibility.
Even more, the noble researcher Scholar Al-Tousi said, "It [Imitating the dead jurisprudent] is not permissible at all due to the ellipse of his eligibility when he died. And this is the current opinion among our contemporary peers especially the late one. Even more, we know no one whose saying is regarded to be considerable who demonstrates the opposite to this."1
And the problematicality is much more confirmed concerning the imitation of the dead person who has long been dead. This is due to the development which has been taking place in the jurisprudents’ view of the religious evidences and in their consideration of certain scientific details which if the old jurisprudents had had a look on, this would have affected their deduction of the religious rules.
A Clarifying Example
We are going to mention a scientific example and we are going to try to clarify it.
From among the jurisprudential rules which affect the work of the jurisprudent and his deduction of the religious rules is that of "going along with" which means that when the human being is sure of a previous thing and then he doubts it, then he has to build on the original sureness and give no heed for the doubt. For example, if the religiously responsible person was sure that he was on ablution and then he doubted whether he slept after the ablution which might had undone his ablution, here will arise the rule of "going along with" to state for him: Build on your previous sureness and do not give any heed for the doubt which succeeded the sureness, for you are religiously on ablution.
When we review the history of this jurisprudential rule, we notice that some old jurisprudents (May their secrets be sacred), after they had examined its evidence, came to refuse it. They refused it because they did not find any considerable narrative which refers to it. After that period, the jurisprudents discovered, through their scholastic researches, some considerable narratives which exactly indicate this rule to the extent that it has become indisputable for them.
Here we say, "Had the old jurisprudents considered the narratives referring to the rule of ‘going along with’, they would have changed, on its basis, their jurisprudential opinions." But factually they did not consider them, so how will it be permissible for us to imitate them?
The Continuous Imitation
What has been mentioned with respect to the non-permissibility of imitating the dead reference has to do with religiously responsible person who wants to start imitation. But the judgment differs for the one who used to imitate a certain reference who then died, for it is wrong to refer to the religious opinion of the dead reference in the issue of the imitation of the dead reference.
For example, if one was imitating Imam Al-Khomeini (May his secret be sacred) who used to permit to continue imitating the dead reference in some ways, then after the death of The Imam (May his secret be sacred), it will not be permissible for that person to depend on his religious opinion in this issue and thus continue imitating him. He will have to turn to the still living reference of imitation in whom the conditions of imitation are available. And then this reference will determine for him his judgment and his religious responsibility.
The still living jurisprudent may say to him, "You must continue imitating the dead reference in all his religious opinions as long as he is, in your point of view, more knowing than the still living jurisprudents." He may say to him this very first saying but not with respect to all his religious opinions i.e. with respect to what he is still remembering from the dead jurisprudent’s religious opinions. He may give him the alternative to choose between going on imitating the dead jurisprudent and imitating the still living jurisprudent.
We are going to set forth the following theorem as a practical example. Suppose that a certain religiously responsible person was imitating Imam Al-Khomeini (May his secret be sacred). After Imam Al-Khomeini had passed away, he found the conditions of the reference of imitation in Imam Al-Khamene’i (May God lengthen his presence among us), so he referred to him and asked him, "What is my religious responsibility concerning the imitation?" Imam Al-Khamene’i’s (May God lengthen his presence among us) answer will be as follows:
"You have three alternatives which you are permitted to choose any of:
- The first alternative is to continue imitating Imam Al-Khomeini (May his secret be sacred) with respect to all his religious opinions.
- The second alternative is to imitate me with respect to all my religious opinions.
- The third alternative is to continue imitating Imam
Al-Khomeini (May his secret be sacred) with respect to all his religious opinions and to imitate me with respect to any religious opinion you wish even if the opinion of Imam Al-Khomeini (May his secret be sacred) is contradictory to mine as a religious opinion and not as a cautiousness. Yet after you have turned to my religious opinion, you are not permitted to go back to the religious opinion of Imam Al-Khomeini (May his secret be sacred) with respect to the religious opinions in which you turned to me.
If you, for instance, continue imitating The Imam (May his secret be sacred) but then you turn to me in the issue of the prayer of the traveller where my religious opinion is to perform the prayer completely and that of The Imam (May his secret be sacred) is to shorten the prayer, then you will have, after having turned to me with respect to this religious opinion, to perform the prayer completely and you will not be permitted to go back to Imam Al-Khomeini’s (May his secret be sacred) religious opinion which implies the dutifulness of shortening the prayer.
Having done with the first condition of the reference of imitation, we move to the second condition, after which we will mention the other conditions.
2. - The Puberty: This condition is usually fulfilled in the jurisprudents even though it is said that some of our jurisprudents, like The Scholar Al-Hilli and Al-Fadel Al-Hindi, had reached the degree of jurisprudence before they reached the stage of their puberty.
3- The Reason: This is a clear condition.
4- The Masculinity: It is related that the scholars agreed on this condition for specific evidences which are mentioned in their proper place.
5- The Purity of the Birth: This condition implies that the reference of imitation be not born from adultery; this is due to the high sensitivity of the post of reference of imitation.
6- The Faith: This means that the reference must be abiding by the creed of The Household (God’s prayers and peace bestowed upon them) i.e. to be a believer in the twelve Imams. This is a clear condition derived from several narratives ascribed to The Household (God’s prayers and peace bestowed upon them), like Imam Abi Al-Hassan’s (God’s peace bestowed upon him) saying to Ali bin Souwayd, "Do not get the features of your religion from any one rather than our Shiite." 2
7- The Justice: Imam Al-Khomeini (May his secret be sacred) explained this trait as follows, "It is a fixed aptitude which calls [the person] to the adherence to what God fearing implies from the abandonment of the forbiddances and the performance of the duties."3
The meaning of being an aptitude is that it is a steadfast trait in the soul which makes the human being perform without any affectation what is dutiful and abandon what is forbidden.
The Imam’s (May his secret be sacred) illustration of justice as being a fixed aptitude comes against other illustrations which limit it to the performance of the duties and to the abandonment of the forbiddances even if the human being does not have an aptitude to this."4
In order to clarify the difference between justice’s being an aptitude which makes the human being perform the duties and abandon the forbiddance and its being limited to the performance of the duties and the abandonment of the forbiddances even if it is not an aptitude, we are going to set forth the following example.
The correct learning on the keyboard is fulfilled by putting the fingers in a special way on the board. At the start of the person’s training, the trainee recognize exactly the situation of the fingers on the keys, and he may type correctly without any errors yet slowly and with affectation because he has not acquired the aptitude of typing on the keyboard. After a training period, we recognize that he is typing quickly without looking exactly at the position of his fingers on the keys and without any affectation. This is so because he has already acquired an aptitude in typing on the keyboard.
Likewise, the one who has the aptitude of justice, on the contrary to the one who does not have it, performs the duties and abandons the forbiddances without any affectation.
This is a clarifying example which is set forth in order to illustrate the meaning of the aptitude of justice with respect to some jurisprudents even though there is a little leniency in the resemblance.
Anyway, whatever the meaning of justice is, it is assuredly demanded in the reference because of the sensitivity of his post. Accordingly, Imam Al-Khomeini (May his secret be sacred) said in Tahreer Al-Waseela [Editing the Means],"The reference of imitation must be a scholar, jurisprudent, just, pious in God’s religion, not dedicated whole heartedly to this life, not devoted to it and to gain its power and wealth as a cautiousness and as is related in the discourse, "People must imitate the jurisprudent who protects his religion, preserves himself, opposes his own wishes, and follows his master’s order."5
Imam Al-Khamene’i (May God lengthen his presence among us) confirmed the importance of the self-perseverance in the reference of imitation in his saying, "In accordance to the sensitivity and importance of the post of reference, it is conditional, as a dutiful cautiousness, that the reference of imitation be characterized, in addition to justice, with control of the tyrant soul and with no covetousness of this life."6
8- The Jurisprudence: The evidences of imitation focus on following the scholar who knows the Islamic laws and the way of comprehending them and deducing them from the evidences. At one time, the narratives express this by the jurisprudent: "…the jurisprudent who preserves himself…", and at other times by the knower and the perceiver.
The famous expression is the jurisprudent due to the great effort which the human being needs to exert in order to reach the stage of deducing the religious rules from the decreed evidences.
Jurisprudence is of two types. The first one is the complete jurisprudence. And the one who has a complete jurisprudence is called as the absolute jurisprudence. He is able, in the different fields of jurisprudence, to extract the religious rule from its decreed evidence.
The second one is the incomplete jurisprudence. And the one who has an incomplete jurisprudence is called as the partial jurisprudence.
He is the one who jurisprudized in some religious issues rather than other ones, so he is able, in only a limited frame of the issues, to extract the religious rule.
And the jurisprudence which is a condition that must be available in the reference of imitation is the complete absolute jurisprudence. With respect to the incomplete jurisprudence, there is a specific detail which is going to be mentioned in its proper context.
We still need to talk about the most knowingness and its being a condition in the reference of imitation. It is in fact a critical and so important an issue for which we are going to dedicate the next paper. Let us go on.
