The [Army] Staff Headquarters was responsible for organizing the affairs pertaining to recruitment of soldiers and encouraging them [to join the army], as well as personal matters [of the individual soldiers] like strengthening the spirit of the combatants etc. The following departments fell under their command.

1. The Department Of Planning And Scheduling:

This is the department that is responsible for:

a) Planning the overall policy

b) Drawing out maps for war

c) Finding out the number of combatants in the army (and)

d) Their weaponry

e) Instituting regulations and rules of military service

f) Preparing the senior commanders

g) Establishing the procedure of selection1

Now we will explain each of the above in turn.

A) Planning The Policy For The Participation Of The Ansar In Battle

The Ansar were obliged by their agreement in the Pledge of ‘Aqaba to protect the Holy Prophet (S) inside Madina2. This had made the Quraysh angry and infuriated them so they began making preparations quickly to wage war on those who had granted refuge to and helped the Muhajirin3. In the beginning, the Muhajirin took up the flag of charge and attack on their shoulders4 and carried out the first military mission without the participation of a single person from the Ansar, under the command of Hamza Ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib, the Master of the Martyrs (‘a)5, and in this way numerous consecutive missions and minor battles were fought by the Muhajirin themselves until the Battle of Badr6.

After the Prophet (S) informed the Ansar about the threat that they were all faced with, he sought their view about participation in war and assisting him inside and outside Madina. The Ansar were ready to cooperate and participate in battle and expressed their decision to fight alongside the Muhajirin with their own volition. In this way, they diverted from the Pledge of ‘Aqabah and the allegiance of Wadi Dhafaran7 and participated in the Battle of Badr and other battles alongside the Muhajirin8. From this time onwards, the Muslim army consisted of these two groups.

B) Methods Of Negotiation

Negotiations with the enemy after the end of battle and the agreement that was reached between the two parties was, depending on the circumstances, conducted by the supreme commander (S) who would take full control9. When the Jews sought negotiations, he (S) dealt harshly with them, to such an extent that he banished some of them from their lands10 and after disarming them, he let their wives and children go11, however he ordered the killing of some others who has broken their covenant and had cooperated with the enemy12.

The Prophet (S) displayed forbearance and leniency with the Quraysh in the Treaty of Hudaybiyya13. He accepted their conditions and even accepted some of the conditions that his companions and commanders deemed to be against the interest of the Muslims14, and went ahead to sign the treaty15. In this way and in order to attain the actual goals, the Prophet (S) would obtain victory through harsh measures at certain times and through leniency and tolerance in other situations16.

C) Designing A Program In Order To Know The Enemy

The Prophet (S) would, at the outset, study the enemy and ways of countering them. The Quraysh were people who had forced him to leave his home and were determined to fight against him uncompromisingly17. The Prophet (S) also began preparing forces and weapons in order to counter them18 and faced them in a number of battles19, and in the end he eventually gained victory and they submitted to his wishes.

However, with regards to the Jews, when they showed their enmity by breaking the covenant [they had made with him]20 and took up arms against him, he was forced to fight them or banish them from their lands21. It was at this time [and for this reason] that the first battle against them took place.

With regards to the other Arab tribes, however, he only entered into battle against them when they were the instigators22 or when they attempted to wage war against Madina and invade it with their armies23. Taking this into consideration, he only faced the enemy tribes and dealt with them the way they deserved to be dealt with24.

As for Rome, he (S) saw it as a grave threat in the way of the Islamic Revolution, especially since they possessed vast resources and had a lot of political influence in the Arabian provinces25. Despite this, the Prophet (S) delayed military action against them until an appropriate time and enough preparations had been made to come face to face with the Roman army. For this reason, he did not enter into intense and decisive battles with them as he had done with his previous enemies [i.e., the Quraysh and the Jews], rather he launched minor assaults on them26 and, in order to develop the Muslim army and increase their military might, he embarked on small battles with them.

D) Creating A Plan To Gain Control Of The Most Important Routes And Courses

The most important routes and courses that the Holy Prophet (S) studied and planned on controlling were the ‘coastal routes’27 which would be a sure means of cutting off the primary reinforcements of the enemy, and he was successful in doing this28. Then he turned his attention to the ‘eastern route’29 that the Quraysh had begun using after the first route was blocked, and by taking control of this route also, he completed his siege of the enemy from all the directions. The Prophet (S) was victorious in all the battles that were subsequently fought in order to regain control of these routes30.

In the same way, the supreme commander successfully planned and took control of the ‘northern route’ of Arabian Peninsula – in the border of Syria31 – and of Dumat al-Jundal32, because of their strategic locations militarily, politically and economically, for the war with the Romans33.

E) Appointing A Deputy In Madina

Whenever the Holy Prophet (S) went for any battle, he would always appoint a deputy and representative in Madina34, and he would change the appointee from battle to battle35. Sometimes two representatives would be selected36 and each one of them would be given specific tasks. The functions of the Prophet’s deputy would normally consist of leading the congregational prayers for those who remained behind and did not participate in battle for some valid excuse37, and protecting and safeguarding the status and respect of the members of the household of the Holy Prophet (S)38. After the Conquest of Makkah, the Prophet (S) also appointed a deputy to manage the important affairs of that city39.

F) Reviewing Of The Supreme Commander Of The Army

The supreme commander would review the ‘mobilization and stationing’ of the army40. He would inspect the army41 and arrange it for marching or battle. He studied their capability for war42, sent back the sick, young and weak43, lifted the spirits of those who fought in battle44 and gave the necessary orders and instructions to the commanders (of the army)45. If he sent them for a Sariya or a mission, like the Sariya of ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Auf to Dumat al-Jundal, and his sending of Zayd bin Haritha for war with the Romans [in the Battle of Muta], he would personally bid them farewell and pray for their success46. When the army was getting organized, he would join them and take over the command himself47.

The Prophet (S) would organize and arrange the forces for parades and processions, just as he had done before the Conquest of Makkah and during their entry into the city. In this organization, the ‘cavaliers’ would be in the fore and were made up of three groups. Then followed the units of the Muhajirin and Ansar and then came the units of the Ghaffar, Aslam, Bani ‘Umar, Bani Ka’b, Mazinah, Jahinah and Bani Hamzah. Is was after this that the Green Column was positioned48.

The manner of stationing of the forces was in such a way that the Bani Saleem were in front, the Jahinah were in the middle and the Green Column was placed at the back49. The course of the army’s movement with this arrangement50 in front of Abu Sufyan and other observers and the station of the supreme commander – which was located in the Green Column – was determined and the soldiers marched in front of them in this order51.

The carrying of flags52 was in such a way that in every contingent and unit, a number of flags were hoisted and the main banner was with ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (‘a) at the central command post in the last unit. The parade and procession of the army was conducted in full military attire53 in such a way that from the Green Column, nothing but the pupil of their eyes could be seen. The vanguard and the cavaliers marched in front54. The Banu Saleem were in the front-line with one thousand horsemen and the commander of the paraded columns was selected by the supreme commander55. Khalid bin Walid was chosen as the commander of three columns of the vanguard:

First: The column under the command of ‘Abbas bin Maradas al-Salami

Second: The column under the command of Khafaf Ibn Nudbah

Third: The column under the command of Hajjaj Ibn ‘Alat

Then Zubayr Ibn ‘Awam was appointed as the commander of the column of the Muhajirin and Ansar and Abu Dharr al-Ghaffari was made in charge of the column of the tribe of Ghaffar and others.

G) Placing The Capable Individuals In Appropriate Positions

Military skills and expertise in the Muslim army were numerous and varied56, like intelligence, combat on horseback, fighting on foot, archery etc. In order to assign posts for every responsibility conditions were placed that were different for every individual. The Holy Prophet (S) would assign the task of intelligence operations57 to such an individual in whom the ability of protecting and hiding secrets was strong, who was well informed, trustworthy, patient and forbearing in [times of] pain, hunger and thirst, like ‘Abdullah Ibn Jahash, Habbab Ibn Mundhir, Zubayr Ibn ‘Awam, Hudhayfa Ibn al-Yaman and others.

In the same way, he would appoint a commander of a contingent58 who was aware about the topography of the land and the enemy that he would face, like Zayd Ibn Haritha, ‘Amr Ibn ‘Aas, Khalid Ibn Walid and others.

As for the flag-bearer59, a steadfast and courageous person was chosen such as ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib, Hamza Ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib and Mus’ab Ibn ‘Umayr. From the archers60 also, someone highly skilled like Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas was selected. The [head] swordsman61 was someone who used his sword well in the thick of war. The [head] horseman62 was one who fought steadily and unfalteringly on the horse, like Khalid bin Walid.

These individuals and others would be given charge of these responsibilities without any regard for their relationship63 [to the Prophet (S)]. The supreme commander chose Zayd Ibn Haritha as the first commander of the army, whereas he made Ja’far bin Abi Talib, who was a close relative of his, second in command. Sometimes the selection was not based solely on his past [military] record64, because the Prophet (S) appointed Usama bin Zayd, a young commander, as the leader of the army that was sent to Abnam and some of the other great commanders were placed under his command65.

Similarly, one’s previous record [with regards to accepting Islam] was not a consideration66; because ‘Amr Ibn ‘Aas was given the charge of a Sariya mission in which great companions like Abu ‘Ubayda Ibn Jarrah and other great commanders participated, while it had only been a few months since ‘Amr Ibn ‘Aas had accepted Islam67. Similarly, the rank and status of a person68 was not a criterion for being appointed a commander. The Holy Prophet (S) made Abu Salama Ibn ‘Abd al-Asad Makhzumi the commander of a Sariya mission wherein others who [according of their rank and status] were more deserving, were present69.

H) Preserving The Unity And Integration Of The Army

The supreme commander forbade disputes and quarrels among the members of the army. He established friendship and camaraderie among them and made them like a single body70. The Prophet (S) prevented the killing of the known hypocrite ‘Abdullah Ibn Ubay and instructed that he should be dealt with kindly71. In this way, he (S) was able to quell the disturbance that was about to obliterate the unity and harmony of the Muslim army after the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq72 because of a verbal confrontation between the Muhajirin and Ansar73.

Similarly, the Holy Prophet (S), in another instance, forgave the lapse of Abu Lubaba when he took the wrong course in consultation with the Bani Quraydha74.

He forgave Hatib bin Abi Balta’ah for his mistake when sending letters to the enemy before the Conquest of Makkah75 and this was because of his illustrious track record in the Muslim army. He (S) also ordered Abu ‘Ubayda Ibn Jarrah to cooperate with ‘Amr Ibn ‘Aas [who as the commander of the army in Dhat al-Salasil] in order to preserve unity.

The Prophet (S) also took it upon himself to ‘refine and purify the souls’ of the Ansar, who constituted a large part of the army. He did this during the distribution of the booty of Hunayn when he saw76 anger and rage on their faces77. In the same way, he instiled affection and brotherhood in their hearts78 and in the end he would be pleased with all the good qualities and merits of his armed forces79. It is for this very reason that the politics of ‘wisdom and planning’, ‘far-sightedness and judging the character of the army soldiers’, ‘giving greater importance to expediency’, ‘ending quarrels and arguments that lead to listlessness and defeat, before they spread through and pervade the army’, were required.

I) Discipline

‘Discipline’ was the honest and sincere execution of the commands that were issued by the supreme commander in order to achieve the aimed objectives80. Discipline in the Muslim army was centred around the belief in God, the Prophet81, his even-handedness82, and unconditional loyalty to one commander83. Among the most important foundations of discipline was the complete obedience in difficulty and ease, war and peace, likes and dislikes84.

The most evident signs of this were: ‘absolute obedience’85, ‘contentment’86, ‘acceptance of responsibility’87, ‘the strength to come face to face with dangers’88, ‘acting with one’s own volition’89, ‘innovation by the executors’90, ‘the profundity of the meaning of discipline and its practice by the commander himself (as well)’ and ‘his method and ability in action’, which he would strive in for the attainment of the required goal91.

Discipline in the Muslim army meant that following the commander and emulating him was compulsory for the executive officers92. It was never permitted, under any circumstances, for them to act on their whims, without thinking, with complete ignorance or rigidity93. Rather they were bound by the spirit of obedience and doing that which was necessary and what they were able to in order to realize the goal94.

The strength of discipline was clearly seen in the Battle of Hamra al-Asad, when the order was given for the enemy to be pursued, before returning to Madina, [immediately] after the Battle of Uhud. At this time, despite the fact that the soldiers were tired and wounded as a result of war, and were mourning their martyrs, they still all obeyed the order and none of them contravened the command of facing the enemy95. Similarly, the affection for the commander and belief in him made the army submit to [what were perceived as] the harsh and unpalatable conditions of the Treaty of Hudaybiyya96.

An example of the belief in the even-handedness of the commander in his orders was that he compelled ‘Abdullah Ibn Rawaha to enforce discipline when he gave him instructions during the fight against the Romans in the Battle of Muta97. The supreme commander would warn against lack of discipline which would lead to listlessness, defeat and hardship in the battlefield98.

J) Determining The Number Of Soldiers In The Army

In the first Sariya that the Holy Prophet (S) sent to fight against the enemy, he started by be sending thirty fighters99 and in the second Sariya, he increased the number to eighty100. With the passing of time and the sending of more groups and missions, this number increased, until the Battle of Badr where it reached three hundred and thirteen101 and in the last battle that was fought, there were over thirty thousand [Muslim] soldiers102.

In the beginning, the organization of the army was limited to the Muhajirin103, but after some time, the Ansar104 and eventually a number of other Arab tribes joined the army105. The most important of these were: Muzayna, Aslam, Juhayna, Banu Sulaym, Banu Ghifar, Kinana, Ashja’ and Banu Layth.

Women also constituted a small part of the armed forces and would help in the treating the wounded and providing assistance to the soldiers106. The supreme commander would endeavour to promote the growth and expansion of this army, and for this very reason, he would protect the soldiers – meaning that he would not send them towards their death or destruction - to such an extent that the total number of martyrs in all the nine years under his command did not exceed three hundred and seventeen107. This number is divided as follows:

Badr – 14 martyrs,

Uhud – 70 martyrs,

Bi’r Ma’unah108 – 70 martyrs,

al-Rajee’ – 10 martyrs,

Khandaq – 6 martyrs,

the Sariya of Muhammad Ibn Maslama against the Bani Tha’laba – 10 martyrs,

Bani al-Mustalaq – one martyr,

Khaybar – 15 to 19 martyrs,

the Sariya of Bashir Ibn Sa’d al-Ansari towards the Bani Murrah – 30 martyrs,

the Sariya of Abi al-‘Awja’ al-Sulami towards the Bani Saleem – 50 martyrs,

Ka’b Ibn ‘Umayr al-Ghifari to the Bani Qudha’ah – 15 martyrs,

the Battle of Muta – 8 martyrs,

the Conquest of Makkah – 2 martyrs,

Hunayn – 4 martyrs and

Ta’if – 12 martyrs.

The people, from the time they accepted Islam, displayed their courage in joining this army and would try to outdo each other109. The Prophet (S) would not send the entire army against the enemy, rather he selected an appropriate number to [send in] each battle depending on the available resources and the number of soldiers in the enemy’s army110. For example, he entered the battle against the Bani Saleem with a section of the forces111 and the battle of Dhi Amr with a larger number of forces112. In the Battle of Tabuk and some other battles, he brought the entire army to fight113. Based on this, one of the most fundamental principles of war, meaning ‘economizing with the forces’, was always taken into consideration by the Prophet (S)114.

K) Organization And Arrangement Of The Troops

Organization included the division of the troops into units [and contingents], outlining the hierarchy of command, type of battle, where it will be fought, the army’s military might, the enemy’s strengths and weaponry, and the modes of transport used by both sides115. The Prophet’s goal from this organization was facilitating ease of command and control over the troops during the battle, motivation and stabilization116.

It was for this reason that he put different units under the command of one person117 and put different types of weapons at their disposal118. This is precisely what he did in the Conquest of Makkah where he rearranged the tribes according to the prevailing conditions119.

In the battle of the Conquest, he arranged the Muhajirs into three columns consisting of two hundred soldiers each, the Aus into six columns of 350 soldiers and the tribe of Aslam into one column consisting of two hundred fighters, and he did the same with different groups and new contingents120, just as he had arranged the column of archers in the Battle of Uhud.

The Prophet (S) would at times arrange the army based on ‘new battle equipment’121, this is why the arrangement of the army in the Conquest of Makkah was very different from the arrangement of the army in the Battle of Hunayn. He (S) would bring together various distinct qualities and talents during the formation of each contingent in order to make them able to fight independently122; like the groups of four who entered Makkah. The Prophet organized the troops in pyramidal forms in a single group and in groups of two, three and four depending on the number of tribes.

The single pyramidal contingent was led by Abu Waqid al-Laythi and was made up from the tribes of Kananah, Bani Hamzah, Bani Layth and Sa’d bin Bakr. The group of twos were made up of troops from the tribe of Ashja’ and the groups of three consisted of members from the tribe of Muzaynah while the groups of four were from the tribe of Juhaynah. This formation made it easier to attain the best speed and movement during battle123. In the present day and age also, armed forces are organized into pyramidal groups of three and four124.

The organization for battle was different from the arrangement of troops who were marched in front of Abu Sufyan before the Conquest of Makkah. The Holy Prophet (S) would try to give the command of an entire column to the leader of the tribe whose troops were present in that column125. Whenever the numbers of the tribe did not match with the column, he would include other groups in it and would select a commander from a tribe that was present in that column126.

2. The Administrative Council

The Administrative Council was a body whose responsibility was to advise the supreme commander about all affairs related to the military. This council consisted of military commanders from the Muhajirs, the Ansars and other tribes127. The Holy Prophet (S) always consulted with this council about issues related to war and he would take the opinion of its members about the following matters:

a) Declaring war on the enemy

b) Benefitting from the participation of the Ansar (in battle)

c) Centralization of the troops like in the Battle of Badr128

d) Remaining in Madina or coming out to face the Quraysh in the Battle of Uhud129

e) Digging the ditch in the Battle of Ahzab

f) Creating a peace treaty with the Ghatfan for one third of the dates of Madina130

g) Whether to make peace or war in the expedition of Hudaybiyya131

h) The fixity and change of command in the Battle of Khaybar132

i) Whether to remain steadfast or move and launch an attack on the Roman empire

j) Return to Madina133

k) The battle between the Roman army and the troops of Zayd bin Haritha where, when consulted, most of the commanders, and especially ‘Abdullah bin Rawahah, the deputy commander, gave the opinion that they should fight against the Romans134

After studying the progress of the various battles, it must be said that the situation would be different from place to place and in different military zones, and the study and deliberation about this issue can be considered clear evidence of the aptitude and soundness of opinion of the Holy Prophet (S) in these matters135.

In this council, the Prophet (S) had one vote just like the other members and he would listen carefully to the opinions and views of the other members. For the Battle of Uhud136, due to the fact that the majority had given the opinion that they should come out of Madina, even though he himself thought it would be more prudent to remain in the city, he supported the view of the council137. This was the beginning of ‘democracy’, something that most of the countries in today’s world are calling for.

The Holy Prophet (S) would refrain from imposing his opinions and insisting on his views138. Therefore, he would respect the commanders and sit with them and take their advice on various issues, just as he accepted the advice of Habab bin Mundhir, Salman al-Farsi, Sa’d bin Mu’adh, Sa’d bin ‘Ubadah and ‘Umar bin Khattab in different situations in battle139. He would always show tolerance and leniency to those who offered advice and would respect their views. He would never accuse them of being ignorant.

With his kind words and clear statements140, he would assist them to remain free of pretence and flattery141 and to acquire good characters and remain truthful142. In the end, after listening to the advice, he would issue his orders. Because he was determined to carry out the decision of the council143, nobody would dare to oppose the orders he gave144. Members of the council were attributed with higher intelligence, prudent judgment and a greater awareness and understanding of military affairs, and were deemed trustworthy and reliable by the supreme commander145.

One of the most important results of forming an administrative council was that the experience of war which was the cause of the Muslim army’s victory were revealed, the morals and characters of the participants were improved and strong bonds of friendship between them were formed. At the same time the full responsibility and accountability fell on their shoulders146 and any matter that was put before the administrative council was discussed and debated by its members, the pros and cons were highlighted147 and an appropriate conclusion was drawn148.

The Holy Prophet (S) would request the views of the council in matters such as warfare149, selecting a representative150 and deputy151 and other matters, and he would stress on the important role played by its members in leadership, because if they were suitable then the commander would also be good152 otherwise the leadership will be corrupted and they will lead the commander to destruction and will act as hindrances and impediments in his path. The commanders who came after the passing away of the Holy Prophet (S) would also seek advice from the trustworthy leaders of the army153. ‘Umar bin al-Khattab gave more importance to this than anyone else154, to such an extent that he would also listen to the advice of children.

3. The Department Of Doctrinal Guidance

This department was responsible for ‘the spiritual and doctrinal development of the troops, its preservation and strengthening and at the same time, for weakening the morale of the enemy and destroying it’, and was divided into various sections, each carrying out specific functions that were different from state to state, but overall, it had a common spiritual goal that it tries to fulfil155.

The Prophet (S) would continuously strengthen the morale of the army156 using various means, the most important of which included: training and continuous guidance of the troops157, putting the supreme commander (i.e., himself) at the same level as the soldiers158, sharing in their sorrows159 and happiness160, defending the soldiers, steadfastness in battles161, [fair] distribution of war booty162, upgrading the weapons and equipment used by the troops in battle163, caring for the families of those who were martyred164, carrying out training for different battle strategies165 so as to break down the wall of fear among the troops, and bringing them face to face with the different battle scenarios166.

The Holy Prophet (S) also used various techniques to maintain this spirit, the most important among which were: expulsion of weak soldiers and those who have been defeated [spiritually] from among the troops167, wiping out false rumours168, hiding information that could weaken the spirit and resolve of the people169, habituating the forces to adherence to strict discipline at all times170 and creating a bond of mutual trust and friendship between the commander and his troops171.

An example of the strength in spirit was the presence and participation of some fighters in the army to face the enemy without any weapons whatsoever172, some would come to fight despite being young in age173, and another group would be ready to face hordes of enemy soldiers despite their few numbers174. Others would pull their horses behind them and would continue doing so throughout the battle175. Yet others would make it their mission to assassinate those who had said or done anything against the supreme commander and who had ill will against the Islamic revolution176.

He (S) would instil faith and belief in the Muslim army in such a way that their spirit would never wane and would provide them the energy and strength to carry out all the missions that required self-sacrifice and struggle177. The distinguishing feature that impelled the soldiers to strong spirituality178 was the hope in the life hereafter and [the fact that] they were faced with two options which both led to success, either victory with honour or martyrdom and entrance into everlasting bliss179. In this way, the father and son would keep their relationship aside and would strive to surpass one another in the hope of paradise180.

In the Battle of Uhud, despite the rumour that the Prophet (S) had been killed, they continued to fight bravely. And this bravery was a testament to their strong faith and conviction181. Some of the forces would [try to] outdo each other in fighting for the supreme commander and would even kill their own relatives in defence of their faith182. Khubayb bin. ‘Uday when forced to return to his previous faith preferred death183. Therefore, the spirit in the Muslim army was aimed at protecting the faith and it was one of the most important goals of the Prophet (S) to strengthen this very spirit.

The supreme commander would also, on the other side try to weaken the spirit and resolve of the enemy, causing them to waver, and instil fear and terror in their hearts184 to such an extent that they were not capable of coming out to fight against him. The most important ways in which he accomplished this included: displaying their strength and might185, using intelligence agents, taking precaution in employing counter-intelligence measures186 and scrutinizing them187, arresting enemy spies188, carrying out attacks using offensive strategies189 especially in the battles of Bani Quraydha and Khaybar and some of the Sariya missions like the Sariya of Muhammad bin Maslamah against the Bani Bakr, and that of ‘Amr bin ‘Aas against the Qudha’ah, all of which were missions in which swift attacks were used. This was similarly the case, the attacks against the tribe of Bani Maharib and Bani Tha’labah in the Battle of Shat al-Ruqa’.

Another way was by propagation of the renown and reputation of the leadership and bravery of Muslim army190, especially in the battle against the Bani Nadhir which was the cause of the Jews destroying their homes and strongholds by their own hands. In the battle against the Bani Lihyan, when the enemy heard that the Holy Prophet (S) had set out [with his army] to wage war against them, they fled, as did the Banu Sa’d when they got the information that ‘Ali bin Abi Talib (‘a) had started marching towards them. Similarly, being quick in defence and repulsion of any incursion by enemy forces191, especially in the Battle of Badr al-Kubra and al-Ghabah, was another of the Prophet’s tactics for weakening the resolve of the enemy.

The Holy Prophet (S) would awaken and enliven the spirit of the troops before the commencement of battle in order to attain the highest level of commitment and zeal192 and would always try to preserve this throughout the war while removing anything that could cause a weakening in their spirits193. Whenever the soldiers started feeling disheartened, the Prophet (S) would strive to lift their spirits. This can be seen in the Battle of Ahzab when the Bani Quraydha broke their covenant with the Muslims, where after the siege was taking its toll, he utilized clever trickery to cause disharmony in the ranks of the enemy’s army thereby lifting the spirits of his own troops194.

The spirit and zeal of the Muslim fighters would increase and decrease in accordance with the varying situations in every battle, but on the whole, the Muslim army would be in high spirits until the final stages of the battles, and in order to achieve victory, they would remain steadfast and ready to attack195, even in situations where they had faced shocking events, the army would come out with their heads held high and would carry through till the end. The Battles of Uhud and Khandaq were two examples of this, because the Prophet (S) lifted the spirits of the army after the Battle of Uhud by initiating the Battle of Hamra al-Asad and during the Battle of Khandaq by causing disharmony and division in the ranks of the enemy. As a result, the confederates lost the victory and had to turn back humiliated.

• 1. Waqidi, 1/98; Ibn Hisham, 2/266; Ibn Hazm, 208; Haydarabadi, 15-21.
• 2. Ibn Sa’d, 1/11; Tabari, 2/255; Because they had made a pact to protect the Holy Prophet (S) inside Madina, the Ansar did not participate in the first battle against the disbelievers. (Tr.).
• 3. See: Holy Qur’an, 8:74.
• 4. Waqidi, 1/10, Ibn Hisham, 2/241, Ibn Sa’d, 2/1-5; Tabari, 2/259.
• 5. Ibn Hisham, 2/245; Ibn Sa’d, 2/2; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/224.
• 6. Waqidi, 1/48; Ibn Hisham, 2/266; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Durar fi Ikhtisar al-Maghazi wal-Siyar, 121 onwards.
• 7. Waqidi, 1/48; Ibn Hisham, 2/266; Ibn Sa’d, 2/8; Bakri, Mu’jam Mastu’jam 2/613; Yaqut Hamawi, Mu’jam al-Buldan 3/6.
• 8. Waqidi, 1/23; Ibn Hisham, 2/333; Ibn Sa’d, 2/13; Tabari, 2/552; Kala’i 1/136.
• 9. Waqidi, 1/177, 2/501; Ibn Hisham, 3/201; Ibn Sa’d, 2/19; Tabari, 2/552; Kala’i 1/134.
• 10. Waqidi, 1/374; Ibn Hisham, 3/200; Ibn Sa’d, 2/19; Ibn Hazm, 154, 182. After the victory over the Bani Nadhir, the Prophet (S) left it to the Khazraj, who had a covenant with them, to decide what should be done to them. The Khazraj decided that they should be banished from their land but their women and children should be released. (Tr.).
• 11. Waqidi, 1/80; Ibn Hisham, 3/210; Ibn Sa’d, 2/19.
• 12. Waqidi, 2/517; Ibn Hisham, 3/251; Ibn Sa’d, 2/56; Tabari, 2/588. After defeating the Bani Quraydha, the Prophet (S) left it upon the Aus, who had a covenant with them, to decide their punishment. The chief of the Aus, Sa’d Ibn Ma’adh, decided that their men should be put to death for their treason and their families and wealth should be taken. (Tr.).
• 13. Zuhri, 54; Ibn Hisham, 3/325; Ibn Sa’d, 2/70; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/116.
• 14. Zuhri, 55; Ibn Sa’d, 2/76; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/114. In the Treaty of Hudaybiyya where Suhayl Ibn ‘Amr was appointed as the representative of the Quraysh, there were many conditions that were made which the Muslims found to be one-sided and unfair, however, the Prophet (S) gave in to their demands because he knew that it was in the interest of the Muslims to do so. (Refer to Bihar al-Anwar 20/335).
• 15. Zuhri, 52; Ibn Sa’d, 2/77; Kala’i 1/130.
• 16. Waqidi, 1/76, 2/496; Ibn Hisham, 3/50; Ibn Sa’d, 2/19; Tabari, 2/479, 3/9; Kala’i 1/130; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/294.
• 17. Zuhri, 50; Waqidi, 2/571;Ibn Hisham, 3/321; Ibn Sa’d, 2/69; Ibn Khayyat 1/48; Tabari, 2/620; Kala’i 1/127; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/113.
• 18. Ibn Hisham, 1/281; Ibn Sa’d, 1/134; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/102; Dhahabi 1/91, 168.
• 19. Zuhri, 76; Tabari, 2/259; Ibn Hazm, 104; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/225, 2/106.
• 20. Waqidi, 1/176, 2/510; Ibn Sa’d, 2/77; Tabari, 2/552; Suhayli 3/137; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/48
• 21. Waqidi, 1/176; Ibn Hisham, 3/50; Ibn Sa’d, 2/19; Ibn Khayyat 1/27; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/294; Atanin Dianna, Muhammad Rasul Allah (S), 277.
• 22. Waqidi, 1/404; Ibn Hisham, 3/302; Ibn Sa’d, 2/21, 62, 117; Razqani, Sharh al-Mawahib 2/166.
• 23. Waqidi, 2/562; Ibn Hisham, 3/213; Ibn Sa’d, 2/65; Kala’i 1/112; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/109.
• 24. Waqidi, 1/395; Ibn Sa’d, 2/43; Tabari, 3/27; Kala’i 1/112; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/83.
• 25. Tabari, 2/6 onwards; Mas’udi, Muruj al-Dhahab 1/215; Jawad ‘Ali, al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-‘Arab qabl al-Islam 2/635.
• 26. See Waqidi, 1/402, 2/755, 3/989; Ibn Hisham, 3/244, 4/15; Ibn Sa’d, 2/44, 92, 118, 136; Ibn Hazm, 184.
• 27. Waqidi, 1/11; Ibn Hisham, 2/245, 251; Ibn Sa’d, 2/1; Tabari, 2/259; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/226.
• 28. Waqidi, 1/10, 13; Ibn Hisham, 2/245; Tabari, 2/259; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/225.
• 29. Waqidi, 1/182, 197; Tabari, 2/492; Suhayli 3/142; Yaqut Hamawi 4/212; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/305.
• 30. Waqidi, 1/199, 384, 440; Ibn Hisham, 3/64, 224; Ibn Khayyat 1/29; Tabari, 3/9; Kala’i 1/104, 113; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/2, 55, 53.
• 31. Waqidi, 3/990; Ibn Hisham, 4/169; Ibn Sa’d, 2/119; Bakri 1/203.
• 32. The Battle of Dumat al-Jundal took place in Rabi’ al-Awal, 5 A.H. and the reason for this battle was the Christian ruler of the Dumat al-Jundal (an area near Syria) called Akidar Ibn ‘Abd al-Malik Kindi, who was loyal to the emperor of Rome, Heracleus. Because his land was in the center of the trade route that ran from Arabia to Syria, he would create hindrances and obstacles and would harass the Muslim travelers. When the Holy Prophet (S) heard about this, he sent a large contingent of a thousand men to Dumat al-Jundal, but by the time they got there, the people had fled and they returned without fighting. (See: Waqidi, 1/402; Ibn Hisham, 3/224; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/54, 108) (Tr.).
• 33. Waqidi, 1/404, 3/1026; Ibn Sa’d, 2/44, 120; Suhayli 4/196, 201.
• 34. Waqidi, 1/12, 2/573, 3/995; Ibn Hisham, 2/401, 3/220, 4/32.
• 35. Waqidi, 1/182; Ibn Hisham, 3/220; Ibn Sa’d, 2/21, 45; Ibn Hazm, 184.
• 36. In the Battle of Tabuk, ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) was initially appointed as the deputy of the Prophet (S) in Madina and later Muhammad Ibn Maslamah was also chosen as a representative. (See: Waqidi, 3/1047; Ibn Hisham, 4/162; Ibn Sa’d, 4/112) (Tr.).
• 37. Waqidi, 1/277; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3/1198.
• 38. Waqidi, 3/1047; Ibn Hisham, 4/136; Tabari, 3/104.
• 39. Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3/1023.
• 40. Waqidi, 1/20, 56, 2/642, 819; Ibn Hisham, 2/257, 3/218, 4/46; Ibn Sa’d, 2/25.
• 41. Waqidi, 3/1117; Ibn Hisham, 2/257; Ibn Sa’d, 2/25; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/121.
• 42. Waqidi, 1/13, 56, 217; Ibn Sa’d, 2/96; Tabari, 3/75; Ibn Hazm, 239.
• 43. Waqidi, 1/20, 87; Ibn Hisham, 2/279; Ibn Sa’d, 2/26; Ibn Hanbal 1/117.
• 44. Ibn Hisham, 3/70; Ibn Sa’d, 2/6, 27; Tabari, 2/505; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/257.
• 45. Waqidi, 1/13, 2/560, 3/1117; Ibn Hisham, 4/49; Ibn Sa’d, 2/35, 98; Kala’i 1/144.
• 46. Waqidi, 2/560, 755; Ibn Hisham, 4/15; Ibn ‘Asakir 1/92; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/108. In some locations in Madina, meaning near the Thaniyat, the Prophet (S) would bid farewell to the army, that is why these places would be known as Thaniyat al-Wada’ and the Prophet would come to these places in order to bid farewell to the army and welcome them back. (Tr.).
• 47. Zuhri, 86, 92; Ibn Sa’d, 2/96, 108; Ibn Khayyat 1/56.
• 48. Waqidi, 2/819; Ibn Hisham, 4/46.
• 49. Waqidi, 2/819; Ibn Hisham, 4/46.
• 50. Waqidi, 2/823.
• 51. Waqidi, 2/819; Ibn Hisham, 6/46. One of the examples of the psychological war of the Prophet (S) was that he paraded his troops in front of Abu Sufyan and when the latter saw the strength of the Muslim army, he realized that they would not be able to fight them. Thus, he was left with no choice but to submit and it was at this point that he accepted Islam. (Tr.).
• 52. Waqidi, 2/819 onwards.
• 53. Waqidi, 2/821; Ibn Hisham, 4/46; Ibn Sa’d, 2/98; Tabari, 3/54.
• 54. Waqidi, 2/819.
• 55. Waqidi, 2/819; Ibn Hisham, 4/46, 47.
• 56. Waqidi, 1/218, 2/457; Ibn Hisham, 2/278; Ibn Sa’d, 2/45; Ibn Hanbal 5/420; Tabari, 2/446.
• 57. Waqidi, 1/13; Ibn Hisham, 2/268, 3/243; Ibn Sa’d, 1/207; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3/878.
• 58. Waqidi, 1/198, 2/553, 564, 769, 3/883; Ibn Hisham, 4/15, 272; Ibn Sa’d, 2/24, 63, 92; Tabari, 3/108, 126; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 2/427, 3/1184; Harawi, al-Hiyal al-Harbiyya, 90.
• 59. Ibn Hisham, 2/241; Ibn Khayyat 1/29; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3/1090, 4/1473.
• 60. Waqidi, 1/10, 67; Ibn Hisham, 2/278; Ibn Al-Athir, Usd al-Ghabah 2/291.
• 61. Bukhari (al-Jihad 54, 82,165); Muslim (al-Fadha’il 48); Ibn Majah (al-Jihad 9); Tirmidhi (al-Jihad 15); Ibn ‘Abd al-Birr, 1644; Kala’i 1/101.
• 62. Waqidi, 2/541; Ibn Hisham, 3/296; Tabari, 2/598; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/84; Dhahabi, Tarikh al-Islam 1/267.
• 63. Waqidi, 2/757; Ibn Hisham, 4/15; Ibn Sa’d, 2/92; Kala’i 1/135.
• 64. Zuhri, 150; Ibn Hisham, 4/291; Ibn Sa’d, 2/136; Ibn Al-Athir, 1/65. It should be noted that Tabarsi has narrated from Imam al-Sadiq (‘a) that the Prophet (S) first appointed Ja’far Ibn Abi Talib as the commander and then, if he was martyred, Zayd Ibn Haritha and finally ‘Abdullah Ibn Rawaha (Refer to A’lam al-Wara, 62) (Tr.).
• 65. In the month of Safar, 11 A.H. (during the last days of the Prophet’s life), the Holy Prophet (S) prepared an army in order to avenge the blood of the martyrs of the Battle of Muta and appointed Usama bin Zayd, whose father had been killed in the said battle, as the commander. Usama was a young man of 18 or 19 years and all the older and more experienced companions, aside from ‘Abbas (the uncle of the Prophet) and ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib, were placed under his command. When the army was about to leave, some of the older companions voiced their discontentment about the fact that their commander was a young lad. ‘Umar Ibn Khattab took this message to the Prophet (S) who in turn expressed his intense displeasure.
  Despite his sickness, the Prophet (S) put one hand on ‘Ali’s shoulder and one hand on the shoulder of ‘Abbas and came to the Masjid where he delivered a fiery sermon in which he cursed those who opposed the army of Usama. The army was stationed outside Madina when the news of the Prophet’s demise came and when Abu Bakr took over the Caliphate, he sent the army to fight against the Romans. (See: Waqidi, 3/1117; Ibn Sa’d, 2/190; Ibn Al-Athir, 2/317) (Tr.).
• 66. Zuhri, 150; Waqidi, 2/769; Ibn Hisham, 4/272; Ibn Sa’d, 2/94; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3/1184; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/157.
• 67. In the 8th year of Hijra, the Prophet (S) received information that a group of disbelievers had gathered at Dhat al-Salasil behind Wadi al-Qura with the intention of launching a night raid on the Muslims. The Prophet (S) initially sent ‘Amr Ibn ‘Aas with an army to fight against them but he returned unsuccessful and expressed his fear to the Prophet (S). Immediately, the Prophet (S) sent ‘Ali (‘a) to the same place and after their rejection of his invitation to accept Islam, he fought against them and even took some booty back as he returned to Madina victorious (See: Shaykh Mufid, al-Irshad, 51) (Tr.).
• 68. Waqidi, 1/34; Ibn Sa’d, 2/35; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 4/1682; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/39; Harawi, 99.
• 69. In Muharram of the fourth year of Hijra, the Holy Prophet (S) sent Abi Salamah Ibn ‘Abd al-Asad in order to fight the tribe of Bani Asad. Great companions like Abi ‘Ubaydah Ibn Jarrah, Arqam Ibn Abi Arqam and Abu Qatada Ibn Nu’man were present in his army. (Waqidi, 1/343-345) (Tr.).
• 70. Bukhari (al-Adab 27); Muslim (al-Birr 66).
• 71. Zuhri, 77; Waqidi, 1/219; Ibn Hisham, 3/68, 305; Kala’i 1/24; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/59.
• 72. Waqidi, 2/415; Ibn Hisham, 3/303; Ibn Sa’d, 2/46; Tabari, 2/605; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/95.
• 73. ‘Abdullah Ibn Ubay was the leader of the Hypocrites of Yathrib. When the Prophet (S) migrated there, his plans to take over the leadership of the city were thwarted, and for this reason he held a deep-rooted hatred for Islam and the Muhajirin, but because he had no other option, he openly professed his belief in Islam. He was always on the lookout for opportunities to weaken the Muslims and bring about differences among them. In the Battle of Uhud, he was instrumental in turning back three hundred soldiers. He never participated in any battles and when he did, he would weaken the spirits of the Muslims.
  In the Battle of Bani al-Mustalaq, when the Muslims returned victorious, a misunderstanding came about between a Muhajir and an Ansar. The servant of ‘Umar Ibn Khattab and a man from the Ansar were quarrelling about who should take water out of a well. The disagreement was about to turn violent. ‘Abdullah Ibn Ubay took this opportunity to start spreading hatred for the Muhajirin among the Ansar. When the Prophet (S) heard about this, he called ‘Abdullah Ibn Ubay but the latter denied what he had done. Some of the companions sought permission from the Prophet (S) to kill Ibn Ubay for what he had done but the Prophet (S) did not allow them to do this. (Waqidi, 2/415) (Tr.).
• 74. Waqidi, 2/506; Ibn Hisham, 3/247; Ibn Sa’d, 2/54; Tabari, 2/546; Kala’i 1/117; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/70. In the Battle against the Bani Quraydha, the Prophet (S) sent a companion called Abu Lubaba to the Jews in order to get them to surrender, but when Abu Lubaba met the chiefs of the Jews, he was affected by the sounds of weeping from their women and children and Thus, made a sign with his hand towards his neck meaning that ‘if you surrender you will be killed’. When Abu Lubaba left the Bani Quraydha, he realized his mistake and felt remorse for his treachery against the Prophet (S), so he made a vow and tied himself to one of the pillars of the Masjid of the Prophet (S) and began praying to Allah for forgiveness. Early in the morning the Prophet (S) came to Abu Lubaba and untied him from the pillar saying that Allah had forgiven him. Henceforth this pillar was known as the pillar of Abu Lubaba. (Tr.).
• 75. Bukhari (al-Maghazi 2/46); Muslim (Fadha’il al-Sahaba 161). Hatab bin Abi Balta’ah was one of the Muhajirs who, because the weakness of his faith, acted treacherously. Before the Conquest of Makkah, he secretly sent a letter to some of the heads of the Quraysh to inform them about the intention of the Holy Prophet (S) to conquer Makkah. No sooner had he sent the letter that Jibra’il descended to the Prophet (S) and informed him of this. The Prophet (S) sent Imam ‘Ali (‘a) to stop the messenger and take the letter. Then the Prophet (S) called Hatab and sought to know his reason for doing this. Ibn Abi Balta’ah said that he was still a Muslim and had not given up his faith, but it was only because of his fear for his family who were in Makkah that he did what he had done. When the companions heard this they sought permission from the Prophet (S) to kill him but the Prophet refused and spared his life. (Tr.).
• 76. Zuhri, 150; Ibn Hisham, 4/272; Ibn ‘Asakir 1/104; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/157; Ibn Hajar 5/3.
• 77. The Holy Prophet (S) was sent to guide a people who were living in the depths of ignorance. People would fight wars in order to gain booty and gain possession over the other’s property, as well as to show their valor or secure their ‘honor’. The Prophet (S) came to these people as an exemplary role model, with perfect morals and an infallible character. But some people were not able to do away with their old habits and we see, for example, in the Battle of Uhud, that the archers who were commanded not to leave their post disobeyed the direct order of the Prophet (S) just so that they could get a portion of the war booty. Another example is what took place after the Battle of Hunayn when the Ansar were given a lesser portion of the booty they began to protest. When the Prophet (S) got angry and explained the reason for this allotment, the Ansar began to cry and said. that they do not wish for anything more than the Prophet’s pleasure with them. (Tr.).
• 78. Bukhari (Maghazi 56); Muslim (al-Zakah 139); Tirmidhi (al-Zakah 29); Nasa’i (al-Zakah 79).
• 79. Zuhri, 77; Waqidi, 2/415; Ibn Hisham, 4/47; Tabari, 3/61; Ibn Qayyim 2/444.
• 80. Ibn Hanbal 3/67; Bukhari (al-Ahkam 4); Majmu’ah min al-Mu’allifeen al-‘Askariyyeen, al-Mawsu’ah al-‘Askariyya 1/131.
• 81. See: Holy Qur’an, 4:136; 24:62; 48:9; 48:13; 49:15; 61:11. Bukhari (al-Jihad 4); Abu Dawud (al-Ashribah 7); Tirmidhi (Fadha’il al-Jihad 230).
• 82. Zuhri, 52; Waqidi, 2/760; Kala’i 1/127.
• 83. See: Holy Qur’an, 7:157; 48:9. Bukhari (al-Iman 8, Maghazi 53); Muslim (al-Iman 69); Nasa’i (al-Jihad 14).
• 84. See: Holy Qur’an, 2:285; 3:32; 3:172; 4:13; 4:59; 4:69; 4:80; 5:7; 8:1; 24:51; 24:54; 64:16; Bukhari (al-Ahkam 4, al-Jihad 109); Muslim 3/1391; Nasa’i (al-Bay’ah 5).
• 85. See: Holy Qur’an, 3:172; 13:18; 42:38. Muslim 3/1433.
• 86. See: Holy Qur’an, 9:59. Ibn Hanbal 2/310; Muslim (al-Masajid 279, al-Salah 13, al-Fadha’il 63); Ibn Majah (al-Iqamah 147); Abu Dawud (al-Jihad 118); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 57).
• 87. Ibn Sa’d, 2/2-5, 24, 35, 56, 61.
• 88. Waqidi, 1/347, 355; Ibn Hisham, 3/194; Ibn Sa’d, 2/36, 39; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 4/1449; Ibn ‘Asakir 1/92; Ibn Al-Athir, 4/344.
• 89. See examples of this in Waqidi, 2/552, 506; Ibn Sa’d, 2/62, 122; Tabari, 3/126; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/105, 108; Ibn al-Hajar, al-Isabah 1/98, 4/11, 176.
• 90. Waqidi, 1/10, 67; Ibn Hisham, 4/21; Tabari, 2/512; Kala’i, 136.
• 91. Zuhri, 52; Bukhari (al-Jihad 82); Muslim 4/1804.
• 92. See: Holy Qur’an, 2:153; 3:31; 33:21. Shaybani 1/118; Tabari, 3/75.
• 93. See how the army took sensible measures to choose a new commander after the martyrdom of three commanders in the Battle of Muta in al-Maghazi 2/756, 763; Ibn Hisham, 4/21; Ibn Sa’d, 2/94.
• 94. Zuhri, 150; Waqidi, 2/769; Ibn Hisham, 4/272; Ibn Sa’d, 2/94; Tabari, 3/31.
• 95. See: Holy Qur’an, 3:172. Waqidi, 1/335; Ibn Sa’d, 2/34; Kala’i 1/105.
• 96. Zuhri, 55; Ibn Hisham, 3/327; Ibn Sa’d, 2/70; Ibn Al-Athir, 2/204. In the Treaty of Hudaybiyya there were numerous conditions that seemed unfair to the Muslims and for this reason many companions voiced protests against the signing of this treaty but at the same time, they submitted to the will of the supreme commander and had to accept the treaty in the end. (Tr.).
• 97. Waqidi, 2/760; Ibn Hisham, 4/17; Tabari, 3/37.
• 98. Ibn Hisham, 3/71; Tabari, 2/507; Ibn Hazm, 160; Kala’i 1/102, 103.
• 99. Waqidi, 1/9; Ibn Hisham, 2/245; Ibn Sa’d, 2/2; Tabari, 2/402; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/224.
• 100. Ibn Hisham, 2/241; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/224.
• 101. Waqidi, 1/152; Ibn Sa’d, 2/6; Tabari, 2/431; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, 121.
• 102. The first battle was the Battle of Waddan which took place in the month of Safar, 2 A.H. against the Bani Khumra and Quraysh, after which a peace treaty was signed. The last battle was the Battle of Tabuk against the Romans, where the forces numbered thirty thousand and ten thousand on horseback. (Tr.).
• 103. Waqidi, 1/10 – 13; Ibn Hisham, 2/241, 251; Ibn Sa’d, 2/1-5; Tabari, 259.
• 104. Waqidi, 1/48; Ibn Hisham, 2/266; Ibn Sa’d, 2/8; Tabari, 2/434; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/247.
• 105. Waqidi, 2/800, 812, 819.
• 106. Waqidi, 1/218, 2/685; Tabari, 3/77; Suhayli 4/37; Kala’i 1/145.
• 107. Waqidi, 1/45, 300, 2/495, 705, 723, 741, 825, 3/922, 938; Ibn Hisham, 3/357, 4/129; Ibn Sa’d, 2/36, 61, 89, 92.
• 108. It should be noted that Bi’r Ma’unah and al-Rajee’ were not battles or military missions, rather they were unarmed missions sent for propagation of the faith who were attacked and killed by the enemies. (Tr.).
• 109. Ibn Hisham, 4/205-245; Ibn Al-Athir, 2/283 onwards.
• 110. Waqidi, 2/670; Ibn Hisham, 3/344, 347; Ibn Sa’d, 2/502.
• 111. Ibn Sa’d, 2/21.
• 112. Waqidi, 1/194.
• 113. Waqidi, 2/454, 800; Ibn Hisham, 3/231, 4/23, 63; Ibn Sa’d, 2/47; Tabari, 3/100; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/215.
• 114. The issue of economizing on forces is something that is given importance and taken into consideration even today (Tr.).
• 115. Waqidi, 1/220, 2/800 onwards; Dhahabi 1/267.
• 116. Ibn Hisham, 4/85; Ibn Sa’d, 1/44, 77, 109; Tabari, 3/9; Yaqut Himyari 2/487; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/193.
• 117. Zuhri, 76, 84; Waqidi, 1/199, 2/440, 633; Ibn Hisham, 3/64, 224, 342; Ibn Sa’d, 2/25, 47, 77; Ibn Khayyat 1/29; Kala’i 1/104, 114, 130.
• 118. Waqidi, 2/800, 812, 819; Ibn Hisham, 4/42.
• 119. Waqidi, 2/800 onwards; Ibn Hisham, 4/42.
• 120. Ibn Hisham, 3/96 onwards; Tabari, 2/507; Ibn Hazm, 160; Kala’i 1/102.
• 121. Waqidi, 3/895 onwards; Ibn Sa’d, 2/108; Suhayli 4/96.
• 122. Waqidi, 2/802; Ibn Hisham, 4/94; Ibn Sa’d, 2/98; Ibn Hazm, 231.
• 123. Waqidi, 2/800, 812.
• 124. Majmu’ah al-Ta’leef fi Akadimiyya Farunzi al-‘Askariyya – al-Takteek, 464.
• 125. Waqidi, 2/800, 812 onwards.
• 126. Waqidi, 2/820; Ibn Hisham, 4/41.
• 127. Zuhri, 50; Waqidi, 2/643; Ibn Hisham, 2/266, 272; Qurtubi 2/1493; Ibn Katheer 3/262, 267.
• 128. Waqidi, 1/53; Ibn Hisham, 2/272; Ibn Sa’d, 2/9; Tabari, 2/440; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 1/316.
• 129. Waqidi, 1/209 onwards; Ibn Hisham, 3/67; Ibn Sa’d, 2/26; Tabari, 2/503.
• 130. Waqidi, 2/445, 478; Ibn Hisham, 3/234; Ibn Sa’d, 2/47, 53; Tabari, 2/566, 573; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 2/594, 601, 634; Ibn Al-Athir, 2/283.
• 131. Waqidi, 2/580; Tirmidhi (al-Jihad 34).
• 132. Waqidi, 2/644.
• 133. Waqidi, 3/1019.
• 134. Waqidi, 2/760; Ibn Hisham, 4/17; Ibn Sa’d, 2/93; Tabari, 3/37; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/154; Ibn al-Qayyim 2/375.
• 135. Zuhri, 50; Waqidi, 2/580, 643, 3/1019; Tabari, 3/37; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/154; Ibn al-Qayyim 2/375.
• 136. Waqidi, 1/209; Ibn Hisham, 3/67; Ibn Sa’d, 2/26; Tabari, 2/503; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/4.
• 137. Ibn Hisham, 2/67; Ibn Sa’d, 2/26; Ibn Al-Athir, 2/150; The youth were enthusiastic about leaving Madina and they felt that if they remained behind and fought defensively, the enemy would become bolder and would take them as cowards. For this reason they insisted that the army go out of Madina, and the Prophet (S) agreed to this even though it was against his own opinion. In the end, the Muslims suffered a defeat in this battle. (Tr.).
• 138. Ibn Hanbal 2/231; Muslim (al-Jannah 64); Ibn Majah (al-At’imah 6, 30); Abu Dawud (al-At’imah 17); Tirmidhi (al-Jumu’ah 43); al-Nas, a’i (al-Istisqa’ 3).
• 139. Darimi (al-Muqaddima 34); Ibn Majah (al-Fitan 71); Abu Dawud (al-Malahim 17).
• 140. Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 1/316; 2/594, 634; Ibn Al-Athir, 1/364, 2/283, 338.
• 141. Ibn Hanbal 5/230; Darimi (al-Ru’ya 13); Bukhari (al-Munafiqun 10); Abu Dawud (al-Aqdhiya 11); Tirmidhi (al-Ahkam 3); al-Nas, a’i (al-Hajj 49).
• 142. Bukhari (al-Jihad 195); Muslim (al-Fadha’il 140, al-Salah 178); Abu Dawud (al-Sunnah 12) al-Nas, a’i (al-Qudhat 11).
• 143. Darimi (al-Ru’ya 13); Bukhari (al-I’tisam 28); Abu Dawud (al-Jihad 37).
• 144. See: Holy Qur’an, 33:36. Waqidi, 1/53 onwards; Nasa’i (al-Ashriba 36).
• 145. See: Holy Qur’an, 3:159. Ibn Hanbal 1/30, 3/105, 4/10; Bukhari, 79; Abu Dawud (a;-Adab 88); Harawi, 73
• 146. Ibn Hanbal 3/729; Bukhari (al-Hudud 71, al-Muharibun 16); Abu Dawud (al-Adab 114); al-Nas, a’i (al-Jihad 6).
• 147. Waqidi, 1/53, 209, 2/445, 478, 760; Ibn Hisham, 2/272, 3/67, 4/17; Abu Dawud (al-Buyu’ 5); Harawi, 74.
• 148. Ibn Sa’d, 2/9, 26, 47, 53, 93; Tabari, 2/440, 503, 566, 3/37; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1/63 onwards; Harawi, 74.
• 149. Waqidi, 1/53; Ibn Hisham, 3/234; Ibn Sa’d, 2/26; Tabari, 2/566, 573.
• 150. See: Holy Qur’an, 42:38. Ibn Hanbal 1/48; Muslim (al-Masajid 78); Abu Dawud (al-Adab 114); Tirmidhi (al-Fitan 78).
• 151. Tirmidhi (al-Manaqib 37); Bukhari (al-‘Ilm 2); Muslim (al-Imarah 22).
• 152. Bukhari (al-Ahkam 42, al-I’tisam 28); Nasa’i (al-Bay’ah 32); Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih 1/32 onwards.
• 153. Ibn Hanbal 5/274; Bukhari (al-I’tisam 28); Abu Dawud (al-Adab 114); Tirmidhi (al-Zuhd 39, al-Adab 57).
• 154. ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab would constantly seek advice from the close companions of the Holy Prophet (S) like ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a). In more than one occasion, the Muslim army achieved victory because of this advice. (Tr.).
• 155. See: Holy Qur’an, 8:65. Bukhari (al-Jihad 110); Nasa’i (al-Jihad 30).
• 156. See: Holy Qur’an, 4:84. Bukhari (al-Maghazi 17); Muslim (al-Imarah 117); Nasa’I (al-Zakah 85; al-Buyu’ 98).
• 157. See: Holy Qur’an, 6:19, 17:106, 18:54, 73:20, 96:1. Waqidi, 1/347, 3/1057; Ibn Hisham, 3/178; Ibn Sa’d, 2/36, 39.
• 158. Examples of this was when the committee was discussing whether to leave Madina in the Battle of Uhud and during the digging of the trench in the Battle of Khandaq (see: Ibn Hisham, 2/226).
• 159. Darimi (al-Jihad 18); Abu Dawud (al-Jihad 25); Tirmidhi (Fadha’il al-Jihad 13); Nasa’i (al-Qisamah 18).
• 160. Bukhari (al-Nikah 71, 72); Muslim (al-Nikah 98, 101, al-‘Eid 19); Nasa’i (al-‘Eidan 36).
• 161. Bukhari (al-Jihad 82); Muslim 3/1401, 802; Tirmidhi (al-Jihad 15).
• 162. See: Holy Qur’an, 8:41. Zuhri, 93; Waqidi, 1/96, 407, 2/535, 3/943; Ibn Sa’d, 2/61, 95, 120.
• 163. Waqidi, 1/78, 377, 2/540, 648; Ibn Hisham, 4/122; Ibn Sa’d, 2/174; Tabari, 3/73.
• 164. Muslim (al-Imarah 139); Ibn Majah (al-Nikah 36, 53); Nasa’i (al-Jihad 47).
• 165. Shaybani 1/58; Ibn Hisham, 2/245, 278; Tabari, 2/181.
• 166. Ibn Hisham, 3/71; Ibn Sa’d, 2/61; Bukhari (al-Jihad 80).
• 167. Darimi (al-Siyar 53); Muslim (al-Jihad 150); Abu Dawud (al-Jihad 142).
• 168. Waqidi, 1/338, 2/729, 803; Ibn Hisham, 3/304; Ibn Sa’d, 2/56; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/ 167.
• 169. Look at how the Prophet (S) wanted to keep the information about the breaking of the pact by the Bani Quraydha confidential and also told Habbab Ibn Mundhir not to let anyone know about the number of enemy forces in the Battle of Uhud (Waqidi, 1/207).
• 170. Ibn Hanbal 5/321; Bukhari (al-Ahkam 4); Nasa’i (al-Bay’ah 5).
• 171. Bukhari (al-Iman 8, al-Maghazi 53); Muslim (al-Iman 69); Nasa’i (al-Jihad 14).
• 172. Waqidi, 1/258; Ibn Hisham, 2/280, 3/39; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 1/257.
• 173. Waqidi, 1/21, 88; Ibn Hisham, 3/70; Tabari, 2/505; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/6.
• 174. Waqidi, 1/152, 2/457, 755; Ibn Hisham, 3/231; Ibn Sa’d, 2/47; Tabari, 2/431.
• 175. Ibn Hisham, 4/19-21; Tabari, 3/37; Ibn Qayyim 2/375.
• 176. Waqidi, 1/173, 184, 391; Ibn Hisham, 3/54, 287; Ibn Sa’d, 2/21; Ibn Hazm, 184, 198.
• 177. See: Holy Qur’an, 8:65, 9:19; 9:20; 9:41; 9:89. Bukhari (al-Maghazi 53, al-Jihad 110); Tirmidhi (al-Iman 8, Fadha’il al-Jihad 22); Nasa’i (al-Jihad 18).
• 178. See: Holy Qur’an, 2:154;3:169; 4:73. Bukhari (Fadha’il al-Sahabah 5); Nasa’i (al-Jihad 19, al-Bay’ah 37).
• 179. See: Holy Qur’an, 9:52. Ibn Hanbal 3/483; Nasa’i (al-Jihad 19, al-Buyu’ 98).
• 180. Waqidi, 1/212.
• 181. Ibn Is’haq, 309; Waqidi, 1/208; Ibn Hisham, 3/88; Tabari, / 517; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 1/108; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/12; the brother of Anas bin Malik would cry out: life after the death of the Holy Prophet (S) has no value for us (Tr.).
• 182. Waqidi, 1/69, 112, 257; Ibn Hisham, 3/305; Ibn Sa’d, 2/10, 46.
• 183. Waqidi, 1/360; Ibn Hisham, 3/185; Tabari, 2/541; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 2/440; Khubayb was one of the teachers of the Qur’an who was martyred in the tragedy of ‘al-Rajee’. The polytheists tried to force him to turn away from Islam before killing him when they were unable to do so (Tr.).
• 184. Zuhri, 79; Waqidi, 2/353, 563, 729; Ibn Hisham, 3/292; Tabari, 2/554.
• 185. Ibn Hisham, 4/13; Ibn Hanbal 1/229; Tirmidhi (al-Hajj 30); Nasa’i (al-Manasik 84); in today’s terminology this is known as ‘psychological warfare’ and it is carried out to weaken the spirits of the enemy’s army (Tr.).
• 186. Waqidi, 1/203, 338; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 3/1473.
• 187. Waqidi, 1/99; Ibn Sa’d, 2/70; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr 4/1473.
• 188. Waqidi, 1/404, 2/550, 640, 802; Abu Dawud (al-Jihad Ba’th al-‘Uyun, 84).
• 189. Waqidi, 1/395, 2/496, 633; Ibn Hisham, 3/244, 342; Ibn Sa’d, 2/53, 77; Tabari, 2/556; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/39, 105 onwards.
• 190. Waqidi, / 535; Ibn Hisham, 3/292; Ibn Sa’d, 2/56; Ibn Sayyid al-Nas, 2/109.
• 191. Waqidi, 1/12, 2/537; Ibn Hisham, 2/315, 3/293; Ibn Asad 2/1, 58; Tabari, 2/601; Kala’i 1/123.
• 192. Ibn Hanbal 4/354; Bukhari (al-Jihad 110); Abu Dawud (al-Jihad 24).
• 193. Shaybani 1/118; Waqidi, 1/207; Tabari, 3/75; Kala’i 1/144.
• 194. Zuhri, 79; Muslim 3/1361.
• 195. Zuhri, 79; Waqidi, 1/337 onwards and 2/440; Ibn Hisham, 3/129 onwards; Ibn Sa’d, 2/36, 47; Tabari, 3/29, 565; Kala’i 1/104, 114; Watt, 57.