The Persian Alphabet: A Contentious Question1

With the Arabic conquest of the Sassanid Empire from 643-650 A.D., a new language, religion and culture were added to the Persian cultural milieu. Arabic became the lingua franca or, better yet, lingua arabica: the language of government, literature, culture, and religion. As a result, Persian, an Indo-European language, became profoundly Arabized, not so much in its grammar, but in its lexicon. According to the Encyclopedia of the Orient, 40% percent of Persian vocabulary is of Arabic origin. According to Gernott L. Windfuhr, Professor of Iranian Studies at the University of Michigan, nativized Arabic loan-words represent 50% of the lexicon but only 25% of the colloquial language. Over time, the role of the Arabic language was reassessed, ceased to be the official language, and was relegated to a scholarly language studied in Islamic seminaries. The influence of the Arabic language, however, continued to be seen in the high frequency of Arabic loan-words and the use of the Arabic script: both of which were eventually reconsidered.

All Muslims, be they Arabs or non-Arabs, view Arabic as a “sacred language,” the language of the Qur’an, and the language of the Prophet Muhammad. In much of the Muslim world, both Arabic and Islam are viewed as inseparable parts of the same Islamic identity. As we explain in our articles “Amoo Sam beh madreseh miravad: Defense Language Institute Program as an Indicator of U.S Foreign Policy” (The Iranian), “El idioma árabe en camino de convertirse en un arma contra el Islam” (Revista Cultural Ariadna) and “La enseñanza de idiomas y la política exterior” (Revista Cultural Ariadna) this relationship has been readily understood by those who seek to undermine it, be it in Catholic Spain, Western colonies, contemporary France, Kemalian Turkey, or Pahlavian Persia.

With the fall of Granada in 1492, the “Muslim Question,” needed to be addressed. What was to be done with the millions of Muslims in Spain? The answer came quickly: forced conversion to Catholicism through the destruction of everything related to the Islamic identity. This left Muslims with two choices: leave Spain or practice pious dissimulation (Watt 182). Among the prohibitions enacted were bans on Islamic dress, ritual baths, prayers and fasting, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and paying the poor-due. At the fore, however, was the prohibition to either speak or write Arabic, for which the penalties were severe, and consisted of thirty days in prison in chains for the first offense, double the sentence for the second offense, and for the third offense men were given a hundred lashes and four years in the galleys while women and youths under seventeen were given four years in prison (Thomson 285). Despite such efforts, thousands of Arabic words remain in the Spanish language, representing 8% of its lexicon.

The persecution of cryptic Muslims was so severe that the parents could not even afford to say Allah in the presence of young children who were kept ignorant of Islam until the age of reason for fear that a childish indiscretion might betray the whole family (Thomson 284). Severed from Arabic, the secret Muslims were cut off from the Qur’an. While they lost their language, the Moriscos secretly retained the Arabic script for writing in Spanish, a mark of the religious significance of the script, and their determination to affirm their cultural identity as Muslims (López-Morillas 17). With time, however, the knowledge of the Arabic script was also lost. The only thing that remained in their hearts was a silent affirmation of La ilaha illa Allah, Muhammadun Rasul Allah [There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah], without knowing experientially the meaning of what they secretly believed (Thomson 285). Due to this loss of experiential knowledge over the generations, the knowledge of Islam among these secret Muslims became severely limited, facilitating their gradual assimilation into Catholicism, and the eventual elimination of Islam in Spain.

This same desire to eliminate Islam through the elimination of Arabic was demonstrated by Western powers when they colonized the Arabic Islamic world. According to Darwish al-Jundi, “The imperialists…were aware of the influence of the Arabic language…They fought it and tried to replace it with their own languages. They also attempted to develop colloquial and regional dialects, hoping thereby to stamp out classical Arabic” (Laffin 67-68). This policy was partially successful in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, for example, where many Muslims speak better French than they do Arabic. Imperialist language policy in the Arab world did not succeed in supplanting Arabic with European languages, but did succeed in giving prominence to local dialects over the classical language of the Qur’an. Despite the distance between the local dialects and the Qur’an, the classical language has remained the language of education, culture, and mass media. In most Arabic-speaking countries, however, some secularized politicians or writers have advocated converting the regional dialect into the official language, thus relegating classical Arabic to ruin. In every case, this has failed, due in large part to a profound Arabic-Islamic identity.

Unable to entirely undermine Arabic in the Arab world, Western imperialists like the French, have attempted to subvert Islam by teaching “secular” Arabic, an artificial Arabic devoid of the omnipresent religious invocations it contains. Despite the fact that “language cannot meaningfully be studied in isolation from context and culture” (Emery 196), French teachers of Arabic argue that “Arabic must not be considered as a religious language” and should be used to encourage secularism and integration (Balta 123). Paul Balta presumes that if the state feigns support for the Islamic culture of the students, they would not feel the need to use religious symbols like the hijab to express their differences. Not only should Arabic be a means of Muslim control in France, Balta wishes to export it abroad. As he explains

Is it not in the interest of France to provide Arabic instructors to black African countries which are in need of them? Is it not better than letting them recruit instructors from abroad who are often mediocre and influenced by the fundamentalist ideology? The approach of the French School is also a means of forging spirits. (119)

In Linda Hamoud’s estimation, “there is a real problem once one speaks of religion in an Arabic language class” (67). As for Balta, he does not hide “the French Solution” to “the Muslim Problem.” When asked whether a secular Islam will be born in Western Europe, he explains that a new generation of secular Muslim intellectuals can serve as an example and “prepare the post-Islamist era” (330). This would permit Muslims to continue, if they wish, to practice their religion within the confines of secular republicanism while ensuring that nothing stops them from discontinuing to believe or to change their beliefs (330). In short, the French policy with regard to the Islamic presence in the Arabic language and culture is to deflect it in an attempt to create a psychological break between Arabic and Islam, an approach which may contribute to Arabic language attrition, a problem facing Arabic-speaking Muslims living outside of the Arabic-Islamic world.

The opinions expressed by the likes of Paul Balta and Linda Hamoud, both of whom are secular Arabs, are perfectly in line with France’s fundamentalist secular philosophy, in which there is no place for the Islamic religion in public schools, no place for Islam in the Arabic language and no place for the hijab on the heads of Muslim girls. It is clear that the secular French have little tolerance for diversity, are afraid of Islam, and wish to undermine it by all means, by prohibiting the Islamic headdress and by attempting to purge the Arabic language of its integral religious expressions, the very Islamic heritage being passed on through Arabic instruction delivered in mosques which is seen as a threat to the teaching of secular Arabic. When faced with the “Muslim Problem,” the French strategy is one of mind control, double speak, cultural colonialism, and ideological imperialism.

The effects of Western cultural imperialism on the Arabic language are being observed throughout the Arab world. As Ferguson has pointed out with regards to Syria, the younger generation’s reduced use of Arabic politeness formulas, both in terms of formulas and complexity of patterns, may be attributed to urbanization and secularization, as well as European and American influence (1983: 68). The Arabic language is undergoing a radical reduction in the use of Islamic, Allah-centric, expressions, which are being supplanted by simplified forms based on English and French norms. As Ferguson has observed, “the profusion of thank yous, good wishes, and the like of Arabic society is being reduced to the models of French and English usage” (68). In many large Arabic cities, the greeting salamu ‘alaykum, the very symbol of Islam, is sometimes viewed with contempt and its speaker dismissed as an arubi, a backwards peasant, by “sophisticated” Westernized Arabs who employ “Allo,” “Bonjour,” “Hi,” and “Hello.” The situation is accentuated in the Western world where a decline in the use of religious expressions is observed among Arabic-speaking Muslims. While natural issues of language transfer and acquisition may account for the omission of Allah phrases, one must consider what that lack means in terms of religious bonds. In point of fact, the missing phrases and expletives from the Allah Lexicon mean that speakers are in limited contact with the Divine, a devastating blow when one considers that Allah and Islam are the basis of Arabic-Islamic identity. Arabic, of course, is not an exception in terms of the impact of Western popular culture. The same phenomenon is also taking place in Persian, where the use of English loan-words, rather than contributing clarity, simply causes confusion.

In non-Arabic-speaking countries, where the bond to the Qur’an was limited to similarities in script, and language differences made access to its significance more difficult, efforts to further distance Muslims from their scripture have been more successful. In Turkey, for example, Kemal Ataturk contributed to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, abolished the Caliphate, closed theological schools, replaced Islamic law with a combination of European legal codes, outlawed Islamic headdress, imposed Western clothing, forced Turks to adopt Western surnames, and legalized alcohol. In 1928, he decreed that the Arabic script was to be replaced by a modified Latin alphabet, forcing all citizens six to 40 to attend school to learn the new alphabet. The Turkish language was “purified” by the removal of Arabic and Persian words and replaced by new Turkish ones. He even obliged the muezzins to make the call to prayer in Turkish as opposed to Arabic. By eliminating the Arabic-based alphabet, and replacing it by a Latin-based one, Mustafa Kemal effectively ensured that future generations of Turks would not be able to read the Qur’an in its original Arabic without the substantial effort required to learn the script. The result of his onslaught against all things Arabic and Islamic was the creation of a country with a divided identity, trapped between East and West, Europeanized by not European, alienated from the Islamic world, but still nominally Muslim.

In Iran, a proud country with a rich history, literature, and culture, Persian linguistic nationalism has played an important role. In the twentieth century, the leading activist in this area was Ahmad Kasravi who lived between 1888 and 1945. A prolific author, he attempted to promote a “Pure Persian,” replacing words of Arabic origin with others he invented (Mutahhari, Tabataba’i, Khumayni 192). He also wrote a series of polemical works, including Sufigari and Shiagari, in which he attacked both Sufism and Shi‘ism, accusing them of being sources of superstition and backwardness. Despite being a good writer, Kasravi became arrogant, went to the extreme of calling himself a prophet, and attempted to spread a pseudo-religion called Pak-Din, the Pure Religion. He was assassinated by Navvab Safavi, founder of Fidayan Islam, an organization which sought to establish an Islamic political constitution in Iran.

As a wanton worshipper of the West, the Shah of Iran waged a war against Islam, prohibiting the hijab, Friday prayers, and imposing Western dress, in the same sad scenario which keeps repeating itself throughout history. Inspired by Mustafa Kemal, and the efforts of Ahmad Kasravi, the Shah commenced a campaign to “purge” the Persian language from Arabic loan-words, and planned to replace the Persian alphabet, of Arabic origin, with a Latin one. The attempt to purify the Persian language of Arabic loan-words, and replace the Arabic-based Persian alphabet with the Latin one, was part of the Shah’s “white revolution.” His attack against the Arabic script was viewed by many as an attempt to alienate Iranians from Islam, and played a role in his overthrow in the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

In recent times, Ali (Siavash) Moslehi Moslehabadi, whose British name is David Albert Moseley, introduced the International Persian Alphabet (IPA), popularly known as Pársik. He is described as “one of the most serious people among all the linguists and specialists who believe in the inappropriateness of the current Perso-Arabic writing system for Persian and whole the Iranian languages as Indo-European (Aryan languages)” [the mistakes in grammar and syntax are in the original] (http://www.persiandirect.com/projects/ipa2/index.htm). While his system, which is based on the English alphabet with all of its phonetic deficiencies, may be valuable in transliterating Persian, proposing it as a replacement for the Persian-Arabic script is clearly questionable on linguistic, cultural, and religious grounds.

The perils posed by adopting the Latin alphabet in place of the Persian alphabet of Arabic origin are multifaceted. Surprisingly, they seem to have escaped Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari. When confronted with the proposal to change the Persian script to the Latin one, he claimed that Islam does not have one alphabet in particular and that “In the eyes of Islam, a universal religion, all alphabets are equal.” He did, however, express some concern as to the effect the change in script might have on Muslim society, and whether it would result in cultural alienation, considering that Persian scientific and Islamic literature has used an Arabic-based alphabet for 14 centuries. He also called for an investigation into who was behind the proposal and how it would be implemented, indicating that he may have harbored some suspicions regarding the matter.

What Ayatullah Mutahhari failed to fully seize, however, was that the importance of the Arabic script extends far beyond the mere representation of a given set of sounds by a particular set of letters. Whether it’s Morisco Spanish, Persian, Ottoman Turkish or Urdu, the “use of the Arabic alphabet brings with it a considerable degree of Arabization and Islamicization of the original languages” (López-Morillas 18). Since the success of the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian authorities seem to understand the importance of the Arabic/Persian script with regards to religious and cultural identity. In fact, in some of the ex-Soviet republics in Central Asia, a struggle is underway between Turkey, advocating the use of the Latin-based alphabet and Iran, advocating the use of the Arabic-Persian alphabet, as replacements for Russian Cyrillic. Both Turkey and Iran are vying for influence, seeking to draw these countries into their spheres of political and, in the case of Iran, religious influence.

Whether the Persian language will continue to employ its modified version of the Arabic alphabet or whether it will adopt a Latin-based one is a decision Persian-speakers will ultimately have to make for themselves. For any such venture to succeed, however, the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran would be required. In the case of French, however, even the state-support of France has been insufficient to ensure the acceptance of even minor orthographic changes. At present, any change in the Persian script could only be conceivable in the aftermath of an American overthrow of the democratically-elected government, and the installation of a pro-Western puppet regime. In any event, Persian-speakers need to ponder long and hard about the linguistic, cultural, and religious consequences of any change of alphabet, and consider the intentions of those who wish to instigate it. If we have learned anything from Catholic Spain, Western colonialism, Kemalian Turkey, contemporary France, and Pahlavian Persia; if history has taught us anything with regards to the Arabic language and alphabet, it is that those who oppose their use tend to be pro-Western secularists who are openly hostile towards all things Islamic. If the Persian people want to become Americanized, secularized, and modernized, then masha Allah and marhaba. It would only demonstrate that the “occidentosis” of Jalal Al-I Ahmad and the “Westoxication” of ‘Ali Shariati has reached a critical stage.

Works Cited

Balta, Paul. L’Islam dans le monde. Paris: Editions Le Monde, 1991.

Emery, Peter G. “Greeting, Congratulating and Commiserating in Omani Arabic.” Language, Culture and Curriculum 13:2 (2000): 196-216.

Encyclopedia of the Orient. “Persian.” Internet: http://i-cias.com/e.o/persian_l.htm.

Ferguson, Charles A. “God-Wishes in Syrian Arabic.” Mediterranean Language Review 1 (1983): 65-83.

Hamoud, Linda. “Télevisión et religión en cours d’arabe.” Les langues modernes 98:3 (2004): 60-69.

Laffin, John. The Arab Mind: A Need for Understanding. New York: Taplinger, 1975.

López-Morillas, Consuelo. “Aljamiado and the Moriscos Islamicization of Spanish.” Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1994: 17-23.

Morrow, John A. “Amoo Sam beh madreseh miravad: Defense Language Institute Program as an Indicator of U.S. Foreign Policy” (7 Dec. 2004) Iranian. Internet: http://www.iranian.com.

- -. “La enseñana de idiomas y la política exterior.” Revista Cultural Ariadna (April 2004). Internet: http://ariadna.cjb.net/.

- -. “El idioma árabe en camino de convertirse en un arma contra el Islam.” Revista Cultural Ariadna (Oct. 2003). Internet: http://ariadna.cjb.net/.

Mutahhari, Murtaza, Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, and Ruhullah Khumayni. Luz interior. Trans. Hector Abu Dharr Manzolillo. Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Luis Vallejo, 1997.

Thomson, Ahmad. Blood on the Cross: Islam in Spain in Light of ChristianPersecution throughout the Ages. London: Ta-Ha, 1989.

Windfuhr, Gernott L. “On Persian.” International Encyclopedia of Linguistics. Internet: http://www.kkhec.ac.ir/on_the_persian_language.htm.

• 1. A short version of this article was published as “The Persian Alphabet in Peril” in Iran Daily (May 27th, 2006): 2 and is available online at the following site: www.nitc.co.ir/iran-daily/1385/2572/ html/ national.htm. The complete version of the study is published here for the first time.