Sayyid Mahmood Taleqani was born to a religious family in 191l in the village of Golyard near the town of Taleqan to the northwest of Tehran. He was born five years after the Persian Constitutional Revolution, at a time when Iran was in a stage of transition from monarchy rule and religious fanaticism. This transition is clearly reflected in Taleqani’s life and scholarly works.

His early education began under his father’s supervision, Ayatullah Haj Sayyid Abolhassan Taleqani, himself a former student of Mirza Hassan Shirazi who had played an active role in the tobacco uprising of 1890-92. Taleqani's formal education in Qom began initially at Razaviyeh madraseh. He later continued at the famous Fayziyeh theology school. He remained there until 1318 AH (1939 AD) when he completed his studies and acquired the level of ijtihad.

Taleqani's formative years coincided with renewed social and political upheaval in the aftermath of Reza Shah's abdication from the throne. The sociopolitical milieu was dominated by nationalistic fervour and religious sentiments. Unfortunately, these two aspects of the Iranian society were never fully integrated to free Iran of imperialism and foreign influence.

During the short-lived government of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq, Taleqani became the candidate from the northern province to the 17th legislative session of the Majlis. He endorsed Mosaddeq and tried hard to bridge the gap between the government and various religious factions. His support for Mosaddeq met with stiff opposition from dominant religious figures. This antagonism and split culminated in the defeat of the nationalist government and the return of the late Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to power.

After the 1953 coup that resulted in the overthrow of Mosaddeq, Taleqani was arrested and charged with harboring Navvab Safavi, the leader of the militant Fada'iyan al-Islam. Following his release, he began to organize Islamic centers partly out of his concern for the rapidly rising communist influence on youth, particularly university students. He also became the Friday imam of Hedayat Mosque in Tehran. His sermons attracted many students and intellectuals opposed to the Shah's regime.

Taleqani spent most of his life either in jail, in exile, or under house arrest. In 1961 the government was struggling to survive a severe economic recession. This provided the National Front and other opposition parties with the opportunity to openly express their views and seek political recognition from the regime. Taleqani and a few other prominent politicians notably Mehdi Bazargan, organized the Freedom Movement, a society which sought to oppose the regime. The opposition was consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.

The relative freedom enjoyed by the political groups and activists, however, proved to be short-lived. In 1962, under pressure from the United States, the Shah launched a series of reforms known as the White Revolution. In addition to provisions for land redistribution, the reform included articles, which in theory allowed a wider participation of women in social and political affairs.

This stirred protest among the traditional segments of the religious establishment and subsequently led to the bloody 1963 uprising inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini. The uprising was ruthlessly crushed and Khomeini was sent into exile. Taleqani and other members of the freedom Movement were arrested. He was sentenced to ten years in prison but was released in 1967. Four years later he was sent into exile in the remote town of Baft in Kerman.

He was once again arrested in 1975 for sympathizing with the Muslim guerrilla movement and sentenced to ten years. In October 1978, a few months before the revolution’s triumph, he was released under mounting pressure on the government and as part of the government's attempt to appease the opposition and prevent a dangerous situation from becoming worse.

Taleqani played an active role during the revolution. He was instrumental in organizing nationwide strikes and protests against the regime, which eventually brought about its downfall. Afterwards he was elected by a large margin to serve in the Assembly of Experts, which was to debate the form and content of the constitution of the Islamic regime. He was a member of the Revolutionary Council but his exact contribution to the council has not yet been made public. His most important contribution perhaps was his role as the ambassador of goodwill, a troubleshooter, so to speak during the months following the revolution.

His enormous popularity among the people and respect they afforded him was a unique opportunity that enabled him to travel to the troubled areas of Turkmanestan and Kurdestan to negotiate peace between various warring factions and the provisional government.

Taleqani spent his entire life fighting despotism and religious fanaticism. His deep concern with the deteriorating social and moral conditions of the Iranian society went beyond his political opposition to the Shah's regime. He was highly critical of the religious establishments for having abandoned their social responsibilities and adopted a conservative policy. For such views his peers considered him an outcast. His new, revolutionary (and “evolutionary”) interpretation of the Qur'an was not welcomed by the religious circles.

He had voiced his concern as early as the time when he was a student at Qom. “In those days,” he wrote later, "I would often ponder, are not these discussions of the Qur'an and Islamic injunctions and its derivatives meant to be put into practice for the happiness of the people and society?”1 He blamed mainly the mullahs and the leading mujtahids for having allowed religion to turn into a collection of superstitious beliefs and practices without practical relevance to the social conditions and realities in Iran.

He had reached the conclusion that to create unity and true freedom, society more than ever needed to rediscover Islam and the real meaning of the Qur'an. His views on the Qur'an and its place in Islam amounted to censuring the distorted perception of the mullahs and religious leaders.

This book, which once was the testament of religion and governed the affairs of men has been reduced to the status of old objects and books of incantations that are supposed to bring good luck and sanctification. It has been removed from the frontiers of the living and plunged into the depths of the world of the dead and the rituals of absolution. The sound of their reading Qur’an announces death ... Muslims do not realize that the place of the Qur'an is among the living.2

Taleqani sought to reinterpret the Qur’an in light of the realities of today’s Muslim societies, particularly that of Iran. The result was the five-volume Partovi as Qur’an referred to in the Preface. What clearly distinguished him from the other clergy was his insistence that the Islamic injunctions must be put into practice during the struggle. He organized secret sessions to discuss and reinterpret the Qur'an during the later years of Reza Shah’s rule.

Taleqani never became afflicted with intellectual rigidity. He always searched for new ideas and wanted to learn more about other ideologies. He constantly sought to improve or reiterate his own understanding of social phenomena. For this reason, his writings should be read within the context of the sociopolitical milieu prevailing at the time.

His appeal to the public went beyond the ordinary people. His ideas were widely received among the intellectual and educated Iranians. His revolutionary reinterpretation of the Qur’an and Nahjul Balagha inspired revolutionary groups, particularly the People's Mojahedin Organization, of which we shall have more to say later. In an atmosphere where many alien ideologies or ''isms" were being rapidly introduced, perplexing the youth and college students, his new interpretation of Islam fell on receptive ears.

Like those of most popular social thinkers, political activists and religious scholars, Taleqani's biography and his contributions to the study of Islam cannot be free from controversy. Already, four years after his unexpected death in September 1979, several interpretations of his thoughts, writings and deeds have emerged. His most staunch supporters were the Mojahedin. The founding members’ affiliation with Taleqani while they were in and out of prison, has led the present leadership and sympathizers to claim him as their spiritual father.

Since the Mojahedin have not so far produced concrete evidence nor engaged in open ideological discussion to demonstrate the extent of Taleqani's affiliation with them, conclusions about the group’s alliance must be pieced together from the events that followed the revolution. Most of Taleqani's earlier scholarly writings on Islam, including this volume, by and large fall into the mainstream of Shi'a thought and scholarship. It is in the application, as pointed out, that he differs from his peers.

Although his views on Shi'a fiqh and his interpretation of the Qur'an run mostly contrary to what is being advocated by the Mojahedin theoreticians, certain post-revolutionary events may indicate some degree of closeness between him and the Mojahedin. For example, it was obvious that he was not happy with the direction the revolution was taking. His insistence on the formation of the shoras (worker and peasant councils), his defiant gesture and silent protest against the Assembly of Experts by sitting on the floor and keeping a distance between himself and the other representatives, his reported opposition to the ratification of the Wilayah al-faqih, the arrest by the Revolutionary Guards of two of his children sympathetic to the Mojahedin and his subsequent departure from Tehran in protest, his routine criticism of the authorities and the members of the Assembly of Experts in his Friday sermons and his meeting with the surviving leaders of the Mojahedin upon their release from the Shah's prisons do indicate a relationship between Taleqani and the organization.

But this is not to say that had he been alive today he would have totally agreed with the composition of the Mojahedin and the sort of socialistic interpretation of Islam being advocated by them. Taleqani had made statements earlier indicating that he did not favor one group over another: "I have no particular affection for any group. I only desire the good of the nation”3

Taleqani had, of course, made certain statements regarding communism and Marxism, which may have created the impression that he leaned towards a “socialistic” interpretation of Islam. Some have therefore unfairly referred to him as the "red Ayatollah." But such impression, are more apparent than real. In a speech at Fayzieh school in Qom he had said: 'the issue of collectivism is distinct from the unscientific materialism. The true meaning of the term ‘collectivism’ is togetherness, which Islam pioneered.

This was the way of life at the dawn of Islam. The Prophet, his associates, and the Ansar4 had a close family-like life … this is not the same as material or preeminence of matter, which must be separated from religion”.5 Elsewhere he says: "We share common views with the Marxists in so far as we too reject colonialism and oppression, and defend freedom. What we disagree with is their belief in the preeminence of matter. We believe in the preeminence of God - the preeminence of an intelligent source of Creation.”6 Thus Taleqani separated the two aspects of Marxism. While he rejected its historical materialism, he accepted its rejection of colonialism and oppression.

Taleqani's sympathy toward the Mojahedin must. Therefore, be viewed from this angle. Moreover. The Mojahedin were the only Muslim guerrilla group that campaigned against the Shah's regime at the time when most secular opposition and religious establishments had withdrawn into their cocoons engaging only in esoteric discussions or taking refuge in rites and rituals of religion. In addition, Taleqani was tolerant of all groups, even those who advocated non-Islamic solutions.

He made his feelings public on several occasions: “Any group that attempts to curtail the public's freedom to criticize and discuss issues had not understood the meaning of Islam.”7 On another occasion he had said: "A group which attacks another group, its meetings, speeches, and libraries in the name of religion is not serving Islam. It is being used as an instrument by others without being aware of it”8

Taleqani's major concern by in his belief that if the revolution is to succeed, it must be entrusted into the hands of those who brought it about, i.e. the people. He constantly stressed the importance of the formation of the shoras. An idea that was not well received among the clerical establishments yearning for power. In May 1979 he presented a plan consisting of fourteen articles for the formation of the shoras.9 The text of the plan was printed in some newspapers and was publicly debated. The plan called for the formation of urban and rural councils to transfer decision making to the local population.

It would have allowed inhabitants of a village to elect five representatives to the council and the cities to elect seven members with one additional member for every one hundred thousand inhabitants. The plan was abandoned after his death; the shoras were replaced by Islamic Societies in every government institution and in the private sector with direct link to the ruling Islamic Republican Party. Taleqani's insistence on the establishment of shoras was in keeping with his life-long struggle for freedom and self-determination. He feared that unless people were allowed to manage their own affairs, another autocratic rule was inevitable.

Taleqani delivered his final Friday sermon in September 1979. It is a testimony to the kinds of opposition he was facing.

“...I have said a hundred times that the issue of the shoras is one of the most fundamental issues in Islam. Even God had commanded the exalted Prophet to consult with people and to ask them to rely upon themselves rather than the leadership. But not only did [the authorities] pay no attention, they are still debating this fundamental principle of Islam in [the Assembly of Experts]; how should they carry it out? Can they? Should they? Perhaps? The shoras is the essence of Islam ... Imam ‘Ali has said, “An autocrat is doomed.” Why do the members [of the Assembly of Experts] say this cannot be done? I can't understand! If the shoras are established, you and I have nothing more to do and must get up and leave, and the people assume all the responsibilities. The people from the south of the city who are lying in their graves plead for the shoras. We are told by the members [of the Assembly of Experts] that the formation of the shoras would lead to disorder in the factories. Let that happen. The principle is far more important. Why should the principle of shoras be abandoned just for that reason? They tell us: “Sir, why are you discussing these issues among the people. Come and raise them in the Assembly." I say to them: “I am raising these issues with your constituents. It is they who have elected us” ... Let us put aside obstinacy and selfishness. Let us abandon partisanship and opportunism. Let us stop imposing our personal will, and, God forbid, dictatorship in the guise of religion. Let us go among the grief-stricken people and sufferers and become one voice with them.10

He died unexpectedly three days later. When his birth certificate was brought to the Census Bureau for cancellation it was appropriately stamped: "For us you will always live."

The Scope Of This Volume

Economic system must be viewed as part of the overall social system. Social systems are ideological spheres with a philosophical (world-view) nucleus. Within this nucleus lie answers to three fundamental questions about (1) existence, (2) man, and (3) history. The essence of an ideology or social system can be discerned by considering the sort of answers it provides to these questions.

Economics, as a science, is the result of centuries of reflection, rationalization and experimentation based on Occidental values and philosophy. This science in its present form has developed to a fair degree of sophistication, particularly since the pioneering works of Adam Smith. Clearly, therefore, care must be exercised when one combines the concept of Islam, with its unique philosophy, and “economics" which has its roots in the Occident. A closer look at the literature on the subject of "economics" by Muslim scholars, thinkers and young western-educated economists reveals that what they have to say has not been articulated and does not necessarily conform to conventional notion of economics. Methodological confusion in various degrees has appeared in almost every book and article that claims to deal with the study of economics from Islamic perspective.

To avoid further confusion it is necessary at the outset to construct a methodology of economics based on Islamic philosophy. This methodology should encompass all the axioms, principles, and injunctions derived from Islam. To describe, define, and construct this system, one must devise a series of theoretical constructs describing and predicting the outcomes of the system, that being the primary purpose of economic theorizing. A prerequisite for constructing an economic theory is to distinguish ‘fact’ from ‘value’. That is, positive statements must be clearly separated from normative statements.

Normative statements are derived from the philosophy of Islam as elabourated in the Qur'an. If one is to believe that the Qur'an is God's words revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by the angel Gabriel, there would be little room left to argue that the Qur'an is nothing but a set of normative statements, that is, not subject to proof or disproof, and that should be taken at face value.

Positive statements are those that are time-bound, historically specific, and subject to debate, proof or disproof. Such statements, in the opinion of this translator, are the hadith and sunnat.

Constructing a general economic equilibrium theory of Islam requires a thorough study of both the normative and positive statements. The study and interpretation of the normative statements fall within the domain of Muslim scholars thinkers, generally known as the ulama. The positive statements are the domain of social scientists and historians, and where specifically economic issues are concerned, that of economists. The construction of a general economic theory is a serious and challenging matter not to be trusted to the ulama alone, who know very little about economic theorizing. Cooperation between both groups is needed if a workable methodology is to be devised.

There are four steps involved in the study of positive statements. First, a historical analysis of economic activities in Muslim societies must be undertaken. This would determine the issues that were considered to be important at specific times and specific places, including during Muhammad's rule in Medina. Second, an empirical analysis of the available data and information must be carried out, and facts be separated from fiction to enable one to propose appropriate theories to explain the observed patterns and uniformities. Third, attempts must be made to construct a general economic theory based upon Islamic philosophy. Finally, a sensible strategy commensurate with today’s realities must be adopted and a balance between exogenous and endogenous forces of society maintained to ensure individuals and productivity. Historical cycles and repetitions must be identified and avoided whenever necessary. Behaviour models of economic units must be constructed to reflect present-day conditions of Islamic societies and their interactions with the rest of the world if one is to avoid contradictions and pretense. Theoretical models must he revised or abandoned if they do not pass actual tests. Otherwise, Muslim societies will continue to stagnate economically - as they have for the past several centuries - while the rest of the world pushes ahead.

As far as this translator is aware, no comprehensive economic theory based on the Islamic worldview exists. Although some attempts have been made in recent years by a few traditional Muslim scholars and young western educated Muslim economists, so far their efforts have not produced satisfactory results. One reason is that these devout individuals have unwittingly adopted the same economic logic prevalent in the West. Using methods similar to those of the neoclassical school they have merely tried to “Islamize” Western economic theory by introducing a few out-of-context verses from the Qur'an and quotations from the hadith. Such approach has, in my opinion, led to failure and has created more questions than answers. These scholars, while steadfastly rejecting Marxian analysis on the pretext that it is “Godless”, have condescended with “capitalistic’ analysis on the grounds that it is at least monotheistic in its worldview but needs to be humanized and "Islamized."

It is precisely this thinking that has diverted the attention of Muslim scholars from appropriate solutions to economic problems of Muslim societies. The classical and neoclassical economic theories (and their Keynesian synthesis) cannot be doctored to fit into Islamic pattern. It would be like trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. An Islamic economic methodology and general economic equilibrium theory must be developed independently as though no socialistic or capitalistic theories ever existed. Such a claim cannot as yet be made by the ulama and the young enthusiastic Muslim economists.

However, and whenever such a theory is born, it must confront two basic issues: how to allocate scarce resources efficiently to the production of various goods and services to satisfy the people, and how to distribute these goods and services among them. To solve these problems a society may have to choose ways and means not endorsed by other societies because of differences in customs, traditions and the perception of the surrounding world.

An economic system constructed on the basis of Islamic worldview may take on two dimensions: (1) moral or spiritual, and (2) material or secular. These two dimensions, which on the surface appear to be in conflict, must co­exist at all times during allocation of resources, and production and distribution of goods. Ideally, moral dimension should take precedence over the material dimension when a choice between these two becomes necessary.

The principal issue in such an economy revolves around the manner in which natural resources are initially distributed among individuals and production units. It involves the concept of ownership and a system that guarantees just distribution of the resources among producers. In this volume Taleqani addresses himself this important issue.

For reasons elabourated above this volume is not and was not meant to be an economic theory of ownership from an Islamic perspective. No general theory or theories are expounded or tested. The author's use of the term “economics” should be taken as economic activity rather than theory. To re-emphasize the point made earlier, one must clearly distinguish between the application of certain injunctions to purely economic activities - from economic theory per se, which seeks to explain the system - and predicts the outcomes of various actions.

The fourth to the seventh chapters are restatements of Islamic injunctions and the laws of Shia fiqh regarding economic activities such as trade, money, inheritance, etc. Economic theory revolves around such questions as consumer behavior and the behavior of producers, but such questions are not dealt with in this volume.

Taleqani explains how Islamic injunctions relate to ownership of natural resources and other forms of property. He provides ideological and legal justification for his views, relying primarily upon verses from the Qur'an, quotations from hadith, and sayings from Nahjul Balagha. He does not however deal with the more interesting question: what would be the economic consequence of implementing these injunctions in today’s societies.

In closing it should be mentioned that the term "property" for Taleqani does not simply mean some tangible thing to be possessed and passed on to the next generation. It is indeed the totality of rights based on human relationships and man's spiritual bond with God.

Ahmad Jabbari

• 1. See Taleqani’s introduction to Mohammad Hassan Na’ini’s Hokumat as Nazar e Islam [Government from Islamic Viewpoint] (Tehran: Ferdowsi Publishers, 1955), p.5.
• 2. Sayyid Mahmood Taleqani, Partovi as Qur’an [A Ray from the Qur’an], Vol. 1 (Tehran Enteshar Publishing Co., 1963), p. 13.
• 3. Speech delivered in Ahmad Abad at the grave site of Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq on Esfand 14, 1357 (March 1979).
• 4. The group of believers from the city of Medina who provided help and support to the migrating believers from Mecca [Note of Al Islam].
• 5. Rahnemudhay-e Pedar Taleqani [The Guidance of Father Taleqani], excerpts from Taleqani’s speeches published by Muslim Students Societies in Europe, January 5, 1980, p. 38.
• 6. Rahnemudhay-e Pedar Taleqani [The Guidance of Father Taleqani], excerpts from Taleqani’s speeches published by Muslim Students Societies in Europe, January 5, 1980, p. 38.
• 7. Rahnemudhay-e Pedar Taleqani [The Guidance of Father Taleqani], excerpts from Taleqani’s speeches published by Muslim Students Societies in Europe, January 5, 1980, p. 36.
• 8. Rahnemudhay-e Pedar Taleqani [The Guidance of Father Taleqani], excerpts from Taleqani’s speeches published by Muslim Students Societies in Europe, January 5, 1980, p. 35-36
• 9. The Collection of Father Taleqani’s Speeches, vol 1 & vol 2, a publication of People’s Mojahedin Organization, 1358 (1979), pp 143-46 (in Persian)
• 10. “The Last Sermon of the Great Ayatullah Taleqani at Behest-e-Zahra”, a leaflet distributed by the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Washington D. C. (n.d). Also reprinted in full in The Collection of Father Taleqani’s Speeches, op., cit., pp 51-55.